

**Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City
Durban: Survey Results and Policy Dilemmas**

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The views expressed in this Research Report should not be attributed to the School of Development Studies.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the mid 1990's there has been an increasing number of foreigners, particularly from other African countries, working on the streets of many South African cities and towns. There are many reports of (sometimes violent) conflict between South African and foreign street traders. Although this has been particularly acute in Johannesburg, there have also been accounts in Durban (see Khan, 1997; Peters, 1999). One of the core sources of tension is that foreign traders are said to be better traders than their South African counterparts (Skinner, 1999). Little is known about foreign traders and the literature has thus far not reflected on local government policy dilemmas presented by them. This research report aims to go some way to address this gap.

After discussing the research methodology in section two, section three places the issue of foreigners working in the South African informal economy¹ in a global and regional context. It is concluded that, since cross border migration will, if anything, increase, creative solutions are required. In section four the international, regional and national policy environments are considered, indicating a number of contradictions. With respect to the national policy environment, it is argued that the South African government's policy is at best unclear and at worst contradictory. It therefore provides little guidance to local government. Section five considers other research that has been conducted about foreigners, indicating the range of activities that they are involved in, as well as further research gaps.

The bulk of the report is made up by section six, which reports on findings from a survey conducted with over 170 foreign street traders working in Durban's inner city². The survey concentrates on one group of foreigners working in the informal economy – survivalists – and considers their economic activities and their experience of living in Durban. Durban has a track record of progressive street trader management (Skinner, 2000a) making it a particularly interesting site for analysis. Durban is in the process of implementing a new Informal Economy Policy. The final policy document (Durban Unicity, 2001:6,51) identifies the issue of how to respond to foreigners working in the informal economy, as important. The document (2001:46) makes the point that there is very little information about this group of people, and this is identified as a key research gap. In the final section of this report policy recommendations are made with a view to assisting in the implementation of the city's new Informal Economy Policy.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is very little information available about foreigners living and working in Durban – their numbers, where they come from, what economic activities they are involved in or which parts of the city they live and work in. Given that foreigners often specifically do not want their whereabouts to be known, establishing a sampling frame would be a very long and costly, if not impossible, exercise. Due to time and resource constraints, the research team decided to concentrate on those working in public space in the informal economy in the inner city. This group was chosen because they present a particular management challenge to the city. This is not a representative sample. Instead, this survey provides a profile of those foreigners

¹ Although acknowledging that there is considerable debate about the definition of the term informal economy (see Rakowski, 1995 for a review), in this paper the term is used to refer to economic activities that are small scale and elude certain government requirements such as registration, tax, social security obligations and health and safety rules.

² All the findings of the survey are reported on. This document aims to be a resource for those working on this issue, both development practitioners and researchers, as well as to provide background documentation for shorter, more succinct, articles.

involved in survivalist activities on the streets of inner city Durban. It is acknowledged that even within the survivalist segment, street traders represent one point in a chain of activities. There are, for example, less visible value adding activities and supply relations that are not picked up on in this study. Foreigners are also involved in small business activities (see Vawda, 1999 and Rogerson, 1997). In order to arrive at a more complete picture of foreign involvement in informal activities in Durban, it is important that further research be conducted on these and other issues.

In total 171 interviews were conducted with foreigners working in public space in inner city Durban. Interviews were conducted between January and April 2001. The interviewers focused on an area bounded by Warwick Avenue in the west, the Beachfront in the east (including Point Road), the Esplanade in the south and Alice Street/Old Fort Road in the North. Foreigners were initially identified by sight and/or by whether or not they spoke English. A snowballing technique was then used whereby interviewees identified other foreigners who could be interviewed. Given sensitivities about legal status, the questionnaires were anonymous and no questions were asked about official status. Near the end of the interview, however, questions were asked about why the interviewee came to South Africa.

Due to the sampling strategy employed the following biases are likely to be present. First, interviews were conducted in English, and in some instances in English and Zulu. The sample therefore excludes those foreigners who could only speak French or Arabic, although in some cases bilingual peers translated. Second, interviewers reported that, on occasion, people were reluctant to be interviewed – some refused, others pretended they could not speak English, others told interviewers to come back and were not there when they returned. This however did not happen frequently enough to be of serious concern, with the interviewers noting that the majority of the foreigners who were approached were willing to be interviewed. Finally, those foreigners who do not have the correct legal documentation are likely to be more reluctant to be interviewed than others. There may therefore be a slight over representation of those with more secure legal status.

A number of interviews have also been conducted with local government officials to ascertain how the city currently deals with this issue, how this has changed over time, and to understand what the pressure points are. A presentation of draft findings and suggested policy responses was also made to the Informal Economy Policy implementation working group. Further interviews have been conducted with trader organisation leaders to understand the perspective of South African traders.

3. THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT

International migration is a phenomenon that shows no sign of going away. Around the world millions of people are on the move – living or trying to live in countries not their own. The number of people fleeing to escape violence or persecution, to find employment or to improve their own lives and those of their family members, is greater than it has ever been (Bernstein, 1997; Hepburn and Taran, 2001). This may be part of a legal, documented process, or it may be illegal or undocumented. In some instances this movement is voluntary – people move across borders for work, education or family reasons. More often though, migration is forced as people flee civil unrest and war, or search for adequate agricultural land or employment for survival.

There seems to be a particularly high level of mobility in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite containing only 10 percent of the world's population, in the late 1980's between 17

and 35 million of the 80 million international migrants worldwide were in sub-Saharan Africa. In more recent years a number of political and economic push and pull factors have been shaping migration in Southern Africa. Ethnic conflict and civil war in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi have led to significant movements of people. Because of such conflicts, the African continent is now the principal source of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons (Bernstein, 1997). South Africa, being economically stronger and politically more stable than its neighbours, is a relatively attractive destination. Given global trends and particular economic and political circumstances of countries to the north of South Africa, it is unlikely that this movement of people will abate in the near future.

Those writing about globalisation (see for example Hirst and Thompson, 1997; Castells, 2000) point to the discrepancy between the global spread of markets, communication, transportation and capital, and the growing concern of governments and their citizens that their borders not be freely opened to strangers. It is pointed out that while the world is becoming more open in terms of trade and capital flows, a world market for labour does not exist in the same way as it does for goods and services. Partly due to there being fewer barriers to entry, foreign migrants are often active in the informal economy. It is also important to note the contrary trend to greater regional integration, one component of which is freedom of movement of people within regions.

4. POLICY CONTRADICTIONS

With respect to migration, policy needs to be considered on three levels – international, regional and national. International human rights law in general places obligations on states in relation to all people, not only citizens. It enjoins states to respect and ensure the rights they set out to all individuals within their territory without discrimination, except where rights are expressly qualified. This international law also explicitly includes discrimination on grounds of national origin in its general prohibition of discrimination. Although international human rights law recognizes the right of states to control their borders, the fact that a person has entered a country illegally does not affect his or her rights to life, security of the person, equality before the law, or other basic civil and political rights (Manby, 1997).

The United Nation's Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families brings together, and adds, to provisions already contained in a number of treaties of the International Labour Organization³, and provides a useful standard on the protection of the rights of migrant workers. The Convention explicitly confers upon both documented and undocumented migrant workers provisions that migrants and their families shall enjoy treatment not less favourable than that which applies to nationals in respect of remuneration and conditions of work (Hepburn and Taran, 2001)⁴.

In considering regional trends, policy within the Southern African Development Community⁵ (SADC) appears to be in line with the direction of international policy.

³ These are the ILO Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143) (Taran, 1999(b)).

⁴ As of February 2001, 16 States are party to this UN human rights treaty (20 are needed for it to enter into force and become effective), and ten countries have signed the Convention – a preliminary step to ratification (Taran, 2001).

⁵ The following countries are members of the SADC: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa was admitted in 1994.

The SADC Trade Protocol signed in August 1996 liberalises intra-regional trade in goods and services and provides for a process leading to the establishment of a Free Trade Area in the SADC region by the year 2004. As a vehicle for achieving economic integration, a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC was tabled in May 1998. The ultimate objective of the Protocol is the elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons in the region. The immediate objective is to facilitate (a) entry, for a lawful purpose and without a visa, into the territory of another Member State for a period of three months at a time; (b) residence in the territory of another Member State; and (c) establishment of oneself and working in the territory of another Member State for each member of a SADC state. Further, a citizen of a Member State who acquires residence or establishment in the territory of another Member State shall enjoy those freedoms and privileges enjoyed by citizens of that other Member State (Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC, 1998). The protocol on free movement has yet to be activated (International Organization for Migration, 2001).

South African immigration policy is less clear. In South Africa control and management of migration is a national government competence while management and support of the informal economy is largely a local government competence. From a policy perspective there are two broad categories of migrants – firstly, refugees (who have been granted official refugee status) and asylum seekers, and, secondly, other migrants. Among the latter group, who are mainly here for economic reasons, there are those who wish to stay permanently and those like cross border traders, who only intend to remain in this country temporarily.

Policy on refugees came into effect as law in April 2000. However, the Refugees Act is contradictory. While placing a general prohibition on expelling asylum seekers if the expulsion will result in them being persecuted or their lives, physical safety and freedom threatened, it does not allow asylum seekers to support themselves through employment or self-employment (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2001; Republic of South Africa, 1998; Rogerson and Peberdy, 2001). In addition, no state support is offered to asylum seekers and the process of applying for refugee status is well documented to take a long time. Asylum seekers in many cases have no choice but to work in the informal economy. A certain portion of these asylum seekers work as street traders. National government legislation provides local government with little or no guidance on how to manage this group.

Immigration policy is in flux. One influencing factor is likely to be that the dominant political party does not control the Department of Home Affairs. As one commentator has noted, the process of immigration reform has proceeded to date outside ANC direction and without substantive input from the ANC (SAMP, 2001). The post-1994 immigration regime is still based on the Apartheid-era Aliens Control Act, although it was amended in 1995 and in 1996 to bring it in line with the new Constitution. The 1991 Act emphasizes strict border control and deportation of illegal migrants to their countries of origin, and allows for any person believed to be contravening the Act to be arrested without a warrant and deported. The Act restricts entry to entrepreneurs with substantial capital, who can show that they will employ a minimum of three workers within one year of establishing their business (Peberdy, 1997).

The largely progressive Green Paper on International Migration, tabled in 1997, promotes a rights based approach, and stresses that migration cannot be isolated from broader issues of regional integration, trade and job creation. In the Green Paper it is proposed that well-managed, legal avenues of entry be opened for SADC traders and entrepreneurs who intend to enter South Africa on a temporary basis, through the issuing of a special trade permit (Republic of South Africa, 1997).

However, the White Paper on Immigration Policy has ignored many of these recommendations, instead focusing on controlling the influx of illegal, generally unskilled migrants, and switching emphasis on immigration control from the borders to the community level (Constance, 1999; Republic of South Africa, 1999).

In early 2000, while the White Paper was still out for public comment, an Immigration Bill, spearheaded by the Minister of Home Affairs, was published. The Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2001) largely ignores the recommendations contained in both the White- and Green Papers. It outlines the creation of an 'investors permit', which will be limited to those with sufficient funds, and also excludes small and medium entrepreneurs from the statutory framework. Although the Bill states that a key objective is to reduce xenophobia and intolerance, with respect to illegal migration, the Bill suggests community enforcement. This is likely to increase xenophobia.

The Bill is not only internally contradictory but conflicts with other policy statements and legislation. For example, while it makes allowance for a cross border pass to a foreigner from a country with which South Africa shares a border, no mention is made of the preferential treatment that should be accorded SADC citizens, outlined in SADC documentation. Even more seriously the South African Constitution draws no distinction between non-citizens and citizens for most of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. The new Bill may even be in line for a constitutional challenge. While some aspects of the new Bill are a significant improvement over the Aliens Control Act, others are a backward step in terms of human and constitutional rights. In particular, privacy and other constitutional rights are at risk under the proposed community enforcement policy.

To date the ANC appears to have accepted the majority of the provisions of the Draft Immigration Bill. Certain provisions in the Bill contradict the policy rhetoric of an 'African Renaissance' and President Mbeki's commitment, in his February 2001 State of the Nation Address, to a review of immigration procedures with the explicit intention of fighting racism and xenophobia in South Africa. After the third submission to Cabinet in June 2001, the Bill was eventually approved for introduction in the National Assembly, and is currently going through the parliamentary process. The Portfolio Committee has let it be known that it is seeking legal opinion from both state and parliamentary law advisors on the constitutionality of the Immigration Bill. (See Crush and Williams, 2001; Republic of South Africa, 2001; Rogerson and Peberdy, 2001; SAMP, 2001 for further details.)

With respect to the management of foreigners working in the informal economy, local government has to make sense of these contradictory policy messages from national government

5. RELEVANT AND RELATED RESEARCH

As implied in section two, the focus of this study is fairly narrow. Although the research team concentrated on those operating in public space in Durban's inner city, only *one* type of *survivalist* activity – fixed site trading – has been registered. Even within survivalist activities, less visible activities such as supply relations and work carried out in private spaces, or even mobile trading⁶, have been excluded. The myriad of other activities foreigners are involved in, particularly bigger businesses,

⁶ At the same time that interviews were being conducted for this study, a study of mobile or itinerant trading in the inner city was conducted by a different research team for Durban's Informal Economy Policy implementation working group (see Roberts, 2001). Interviewers were asked to not interview mobile traders due to the possibility of duplication.

have not been registered. In addition, the research has been undertaken in Durban's inner city, to the exclusion of outlying areas and other cities. Finally, although South African trader organisation leaders were interviewed, South African traders themselves were not interviewed. In this section we reflect on other relevant and related research⁷ that either supplements our research findings or provides a useful point of comparison. To some extent this addresses the gaps in this research. More importantly, however, it gives an indication of areas for future research if a more complete picture of foreigners' economic activities is to be attained. Suggestions are made with Durban's new Informal Economy Policy process in mind.

Peberdy and Crush's (1998) study entitled "*Trading Places: Cross-Border Traders and the South African Informal Sector*" concentrates on foreigner traders' involvement in the craft sector. The study highlights their economic contribution. In total, 107 non-South African traders of handicrafts and curios were interviewed in Johannesburg and Cape Town. It was found that these traders not only supported the craft industry but also invested the majority of their profits in South Africa. This is the kind of economic activity that the South African government is encouraging on a macro level, which is indicated in strategy documents like Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and in their approach to trade liberalisation. Further, it was also found that less than 4% of those interviewed intended on staying in South Africa. This demonstrates that these traders are not (as they are often claimed to be) disguised emigrants. In addition, over 20% of the respondents were found to employ South Africans. Key informant interviews were conducted with a number of cross-border craft traders in order to supplement information on this group of migrants who are relatively under-represented in this sample. Findings from these interviews are reported on in Appendix 1 (p.39).

Rogerson's (1997) study entitled "*International Migration, Immigrant Entrepreneurs and South Africa's Small Enterprise Economy*" consists of a sample of 70 immigrant entrepreneurs who have established small businesses in Johannesburg. While this study includes those involved in survivalist activities, the aim is to explicitly seek out more formalised and established enterprises. Rogerson's study reveals the vibrant and diverse nature of small business activity that foreigners are involved in. Most of the small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) interviewed fall into the category of retail or service enterprises (77%) rather than production activities. The most common SMME activities were selling curios, retailing ethnic clothes and foods, motor-car repairs / panel beating and running hairdressing salons. Other activities include the operation of restaurants, nightclubs, cafes, a music shop, and several import-export businesses. The smaller group of production SMMEs were clustered in the clothing industry. He found that SMMEs surveyed created on average 3.3 jobs per business. Interestingly, a number of SMME owners started as street traders.

These studies highlight the following in terms of research gaps:

- More Durban specific and comprehensive analysis of foreign involvement in the craft industry would be useful. This is particularly because craft production and distribution is a core component of the tourism industry, one of Durban's few expanding industries.
- Further industry specific information is needed. There are indications, for example, that foreigners are involved in both the manufacture and retail of clothing.

⁷ None of the research about foreigners we came across used a sampling frame. (This may be because of the difficulties highlighted in section 2. This does however mean that none of these studies can claim to be representative.

- It is critical to gain an understanding of foreign owned *small* businesses (as opposed to survivalist activities) in the Durban area.

Other studies about foreigners in the Durban area supplement our research. Some studies reflect on the challenges particular nationalities confront – Gema (2001)⁸ for Ethiopians, Geyevu (1997)⁹ for Ghanaians and Sabet-Shargi (1999)¹⁰ for Congolese migrants. Vawda (1999), using qualitative research techniques, concentrates on Senegalese and Malawian communities in an area northwest of the inner city. Maharaj and Moodley (2001) interviewed 100 unauthorized migrants and 10 people employing unauthorised migrants in the Durban region. While the size of the group surveyed is much bigger than that of previous studies, the focus is on those who are formally employed.¹¹

McDonald, Mashike and Golden's (1999) study provides a national level point of comparison. It consists of a sample of 501 migrants, including 50 interviews in Durban, 50 in Cape Town, 51 in Carletonville, and 350 in Gauteng (Johannesburg and the East Rand), some of whom worked in the informal economy. In order to gain a clearer understanding of some of the differences and similarities between foreign and local traders in Durban, we draw on the results of a Data Research Africa (DRA) survey of 550 street traders in Durban¹². Although these two studies provide a useful point of reflection, they are not directly comparable. In both cases different questionnaires were used and the surveys were conducted at different times.

6. RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1 Demographics of foreign street traders working in inner city Durban

As table one indicates, most respondents are young single men. This is in line with international findings on migration (de Haan, 2000). Interviewers noted that there were very few foreign women traders.¹³ This is in contrast to South African traders. It is estimated that over 60% of South African traders are women (Lund, Nicholson and Skinner, 2000). This finding however ties in with Peberdy and Crush's (1998) contention that women tend to participate in less visible forms of trade, as well as the fact that women are in South Africa for shorter periods of time.

Table 1: Sex breakdown (n=171)

<i>Gender</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Male	164	96
Female	7	4

⁸ Gema (2001) interviewed 48 Ethiopian asylum seekers (39 of whom are working as hawkers or traders).

⁹ Geyevu (1997) interviewed 50 non-professional illegal Ghanaian immigrants.

¹⁰ Sabet-Shargi (1999) interviewed 10 Congolese refugees (three of whom were involved in small businesses).

¹¹ Further research conducted in the Durban area is Maharaj and Rajkumar's (1997) study entitled "*The 'Alien Invasion' in South Africa: Illegal Immigrants in Durban*" which reflects on interviews with 23 foreign migrants in Westville Prison. This study problematically generalises its findings for all foreigners in the Durban area.

¹² This has been recorded by May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk (1997), but the actual DRA data has also been analysed to provide further findings.

¹³ They did however also note that the few foreign women who they came across were reluctant to talk. There may therefore be a slight under representation of women in this sample.

These foreign street traders are relatively young, with an average age of 27 years (mean = 27.19). The youngest trader was 17 years, while the oldest was 54 years of age. Peberdy and Crush (1998) find that female migrants are, on average, older than their male counterparts, and this is true for this sample, as the average age of women is 35 years (mean=35.43), while for men it is 27 years (mean=26.82). There are similar trends among South African traders. As with this sample, May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk (1997) found the majority of Durban traders to be between the ages of 21 and 30 years.

Most of traders in the sample are single (78%), and a high proportion (58%) do not have children. Only 22% are married or co-habit. Those who do have children have an average of 2.2 children. Further, 80% of these children live either in their country of origin or in another country outside of South Africa. This indicates that the extent to which foreign street traders are a burden to the state (due to demands for education, health and other services for their dependents) may be over exaggerated. Furthermore, it reinforces the fact that foreign street traders do not necessarily intend to stay in South Africa, an issue we return to later in the report.

6.2 Countries of origin and reasons for leaving

Countries of origin

Foreign street traders surveyed in this study come from a host of countries across Africa – 17 countries in total. There are however clusters of certain nationalities. Table two shows that almost a quarter of respondents come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), while just over a fifth are from Senegal. A large number of migrants are from Burundi, Tanzania and Mozambique. It is also noteworthy that half of the interviewees are from SADC countries, while the remainder are from further afield, namely Central-, East- and West Africa.¹⁴

Table 2: Country and region from which foreign traders originate (n=171)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Region*</i>	<i>No. of respondents</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Angola	SADC	8	5
Burundi	CA	15	9
DRC	SADC	40	23
Ghana	WA	6	4
Kenya	EA	9	5
Malawi	SADC	2	1
Mali	WA	5	3
Mozambique	SADC	12	7
Nigeria	WA	7	4
Rwanda	CA	4	2
Senegal	WA	35	21
Sierra Leone	WA	1	1
Somalia	EA	3	2
Tanzania	SADC	13	8
Uganda	EA	1	1
Zambia	SADC	2	1
Zimbabwe	SADC	8	5

¹⁴ It should be noted that the DRC was only admitted into SADC in 1997. Although the DRC is included as a SADC country in this study, it is regarded as a Central African country by Rogerson (1997) and Peberdy and Crush (1998).

* CA=Central Africa, EA=East Africa, WA=West Africa

Reasons for leaving home

Although direct questions were not asked about legal status, respondents were asked why they had left their home country. In all, almost half (47%) said that they had left because of political reasons (civil war, political violence or instability, or ethnic or religious problems) and thus potentially have the right to live and work here. Some comments highlight the extreme conditions under which respondents left their home countries. One migrant from Rwanda, “left ... because of [the] civil war which claimed so many lives including my family”. Another foreign trader describes how “rebels killed my family and forced me to join them. I ran away after two villages were destroyed”. Almost all of the foreign traders from the DRC (98%) and Burundi (87%) have left for political reasons, in addition to 60% of those from SADC countries. Thirty-six percent of these political migrants have no family or are unsure where their family is: “I am not sure. We all dispersed as the war escalated”, and “I don’t know. They might have died or have fled to somewhere else”.

Those migrants who are here for political reasons are likely to be either refugees or asylum seekers. Once refugee status has been granted, these migrants are entitled to be employed or to take up self-employment. However, asylum seekers are not entitled to be either self-employed or employed, despite the fact that they receive no state support while awaiting the outcome of their applications.

The other half of the sample (47%) gave some economic reason (either economic push/poverty or economic pull) for leaving their home country.¹⁵ Once again there are trends according to country of origin - 86% of the Senegalese, 85% of Tanzanians and 83% of Mozambicans have left for economic reasons. Of those who have left for economic reasons, 41% are from the SADC region and 59% are non-SADC migrants. These SADC migrants potentially have added rights, including economic rights, in terms of the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community, and should therefore also be regarded differently to those from non-SADC countries.

The final 6% of foreign traders gave other reasons for leaving. Either they wanted to see South Africa, had family in South Africa, or left for personal or family reasons.

What this and other demographic data on these traders demonstrates, is that foreign traders working in Durban’s inner city should not be regarded as a homogenous group.

6.3 Year of arrival and reason for choosing Durban

Date of arrival

While in South Africa there is a long history of foreign contract labour, with a few exceptions, foreigners working as street traders are a fairly recent phenomenon. Table three shows a sudden increase of foreign traders between 1997 and 1999.

Table 3: Year of arrival by region and select countries (n=168)

	<i>All</i>	<i>SADC</i>	<i>Non-SADC</i>	<i>DRC</i>	<i>Senegal</i>
1991	1	1	-	-	-

¹⁵ From this point onwards in the report we make reference to political and economic migrants on the basis of responses to this question.

1994	3	1	2	-	1
1995	5	2	3	2	-
1996	14	5	9	2	3
1997	34	10	24	4	12
1998	41	25	16	12	6
1999	47	24	23	12	1
2000	17	11	6	8	3
2001	6	4	2	1	-
	168	83	85	39	35

*Not all migrants stated year of arrival

While McDonald, Mashike and Golden (1999) note that regional differences are apparent in the length of time that migrants have been coming to South Africa, from table three it can be seen that among this group of foreign traders regional differences are not as stark as would be imagined. Proportionally more traders from non-SADC countries came earlier, and comparatively fewer have come more recently. The same is true for the DRC and Senegal. Those traders that are Burundian, Mozambican, Senegalese and Tanzanian all arrived, on average, three years ago. Most of those from the DRC arrived, on average, two years ago, when conflict erupted in that country in the second half of 1998.

Five percent of the sample are cross-border traders who constantly move in and out of the country: *"I am in and out of South Africa. I spend three weeks in South Africa as a visitor, then about four months in Zimbabwe"*. Given that cross border traders are particularly active in the craft sector and that only a small number of craft traders were interviewed in this study, there is likely to be an under representation of cross border traders in this sample. Cross border traders also tend to be less visible than their fixed site counterparts.

Why Durban as a destination?

Foreign traders come to Durban for a variety of reasons: for some it is part of an explicit plan, for others the decision is arbitrary. As can be seen in table four, a large portion of foreign traders chose Durban because they considered it to be a nice place, often after hearing so from fellow compatriots. One respondent commented: *"People who had visited Durban before I left my country complemented the beauty of the city. This attracted me"*. Durban was also contrasted with other South African cities, particularly Johannesburg: *"There is no place as peaceful as Durban. Johannesburg is full of criminals and police think we foreigners are criminals"*. Some respondents mentioned the fact that there are not as many languages to learn in Durban: *"I like the place... people speak only two languages, Zulu and English"*. A substantial number of foreign traders arrive in Durban for no apparent reason: *"I did not choose Durban, I only found myself here as I came through Namibia in a truck"*. This was the case for more political migrants (42%) than economic (22%) migrants. Understandably, those who are forced to leave their home countries for political reasons have less choice in where they are going to settle, or have given it less clear thought.

Table 4: Reason Durban chosen across region and status of foreign trader (n=169)

Reason	%*	SADC	Non-SADC	Political	Economic	Other
Nice place	34	21	19	20	17	3
Contacts here	31	24	27	22	24	5
"Just landed here"	31	30	17	31	15	1

Less crime	17	6	18	8	16	-
Less harassment	2	-	1	-	1	-
Other	6	4	2	-	5	1
		85	84	81	78	10

* Some traders stated more than one reason

Many foreign traders arrive in Durban because their fellow compatriots are living here: *"I thought I would be comfortable because there [are] many Tanzanians here"*. There is no real difference between the two main types of foreign traders on this issue - 27% of political migrants and 31% of economic migrants have contacts here. Interestingly 31% of Senegalese, 25% of those from the DRC and 62% of Tanzanians stated they have contacts here indicating certain clusterings of nationalities.

6.4 Education, skill levels and work experience

Education is not a good marker of being a good trader. In some countries education levels are not high in general, yet from a young age the art of selling goods and delivering customer service forms an inherent part of many of the cultures from which these foreigners originate, and could be considered to be a type of informal education. In many of these countries practical subjects, such as wire-craft making, are offered at schools from an early age. These factors must all be taken into account when considering education levels.

Schooling

Foreign traders have more schooling than local traders, and political migrants have more schooling on average than economic migrants. There is an average of nine years of schooling among foreign traders (mean=8.8). Only 5% of foreign traders have no formal education. This is considerably less than the 12% of street traders in Durban who have no schooling (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997)¹⁶. Seventy-one percent of foreign traders have some secondary education (8 or more years). This is comparable to the 73% of foreign immigrants and migrants in the national sample who have some secondary education (McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999). Further, a quarter of the respondents in this sample have 12 years or more of schooling. Only 11% of South African street traders in Durban have a matric or further education (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997). There is an interesting difference in the level of schooling between political and economic migrants: 37% of political migrants have at least 12 years of schooling, as opposed to only 14% of economic migrants.

Vocational training

Fifteen percent of foreign traders reported that they had undergone vocational training, indicating that a number of foreigners trading on Durban's inner city streets are skilled artisans. This training is in a wide variety of skills – sewing, shoe making, shoe design, shoe repairs, hairdressing, electronics, craft making, painting, sculpting, welding, carpentry, boiler making, plumbing and building. In some cases, this kind of training is not widely available in South Africa.

¹⁶ The fieldwork for May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk's study was conducted in 1997, while the fieldwork for this study was conducted in 2001. As previously noted, these studies are therefore not directly comparable. There is no reason to believe however that statistics like these would have radically changed in the last four years. This cautionary note holds for all comparison's using May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk's work.

Tertiary education

The tertiary educational attainment of traders from other African countries is much higher than that of South African traders. Fourteen percent of respondents noted that they had begun tertiary education or had completed it. Almost a third had some form of further education or training, that is, excluding schooling but including vocational training and tertiary education. Only 1% of street traders in Durban have 'more than a matric' (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997).

There is a significant difference between political and economic migrants – 22% of the former and only 4% of the latter have tertiary education of some sort. There are also regional trends with 18% of traders from SADC countries, as opposed to 9% of traders from non-SADC countries, having tertiary education. Of those traders who have professional qualifications, five have a teaching qualification, four have an engineering qualification, three are doctors, and two have qualified as lawyers. In addition, one foreign trader each has International Relations-, Management- and Information Technology training, and one has a Bachelor of Commerce. There are also distinct country trends, with 14 of the 23 traders who had tertiary education coming from the DRC.

The average length of tertiary education among the foreigners sampled is three years (mean=3.2), and the length of education ranges from one year to seven years. Some respondents noted that they have not completed their education as a result of political conflict and instability. For example, in response to a question about their future intentions two traders said the following: "*I want to continue my studies in South Africa*", and "*I want to study further at a college here in Durban*". Seven percent said they wanted to continue studying.

Work in country of origin

Almost two-thirds of the respondents had been employed in their home countries before coming to South Africa. The remainder had been unemployed (16%) or had been studying (22%) before they left their home countries. Three quarters of those who had been studying left their countries for political reasons. Moreover, 15% of these foreign traders had been working as professionals or artisans in their countries of origin. Only 14% are doing the same job or trading in the same goods as they were in their countries of origin. A further 8% of foreigners had been trading back home, but in different goods to what they are trading in here. In addition, 9% of the foreigners had been drivers in their home countries. The remainder had been employed variously in farming, doing haircutting or security work, as soldiers, working in factories or in clerical positions, working in a 'business' or in the fishing industry.

Work of choice

Respondents were also asked what their work of choice would be¹⁷. Fifteen percent of respondents want to do what they have been trained for or what they did in their home country. The possibility therefore exists for skills to be transferred from these foreign traders to the local people. This thought was echoed by one trader who said "*I want to teach ... young people how to use their hands by making craft work*". A further 15% want to continue or to expand what they are currently doing. One trader wants to "*open a shop and sell goods in larger numbers than in the street*". Seventy percent of traders who either wanted to continue and/or expand their current

¹⁷ Responses to this question indicate that it was perceived in various ways by respondents, which in turn rendered some of the data meaningless. Twenty eight percent of respondents, for example, expressed fairly ambitious and in many cases unrealistic aspirations of what they would like to become.

businesses or do what they have been trained to do in their home countries, said they would need to, or be able to, employ other people.

6.5 Work activities of foreign traders

How foreign traders started their work

As can be seen from table five, half of the respondents started their business using money, goods or skills they brought in or learnt from their home country. “*I saved money back home before I escaped to South Africa. Then I bought everything here to start my business*”. A fellow migrant, family member or a friend assisted over a fifth of traders. Combined with findings in the previous section, this indicates that there is a reliance on social networks among foreign traders. Interestingly, three traders noted that they had been given a loan to start their business by a South African Muslim organisation, highlighting another aspect of social networks¹⁸. Nearly a fifth of migrants moved into self-employment after first being employed, either by formal or informal businesses. A very small percentage of traders saved money from doing similar work in other cities.

Table 5: How foreign traders started their work (n=171)

<i>How foreign traders started their work</i>	%*
Brought money/goods/skills from home	50
Assisted by fellow migrant/friend/family member	23
Employed first, then started own business	19
Started with nothing	8
Savings from same work in other South African city	2
Other	3

*More than one response could be given

Table six considers differences between political and economic migrants with respect to how traders started their economic activities. More economic migrants bring goods, money or their trade to this country than political migrants, indicating that more planning goes into their coming here. Social networks appear to be stronger among refugees and asylum seekers. Of those who were assisted in starting their business, 53% are political migrants and 34% are economic migrants. There are also trends related to country of origin - only 11% of the Senegalese as opposed to 30% of those from the DRC obtained this type of assistance.

Table 6: How foreign traders started work by status (percentages) (n=142)

<i>How foreign traders started work</i>	Political	Economic
Brought money/goods/skills from home	46	58
Assisted by fellow migrant/friend/family member	23	16
Employed first, then started own business	24	14
Started with nothing	4	9

¹⁸ Key informants indicated that religious networks are particularly strong among Senegalese traders. The role of networks in facilitating and supporting migration is a critical area for further research.

Same work in another South African city	3	-
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Self employed versus employed

Nearly all (93%) of those interviewed were self-employed, with only 12 foreign traders being employed by someone else. Since the number of those employed by others is so small, no specific conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this group.

Main types of work

Foreign traders are involved in a variety of service and retail activities on the streets of inner city Durban. As table seven indicates, almost half (47%) of the foreign traders are cutting hair or repairing shoes, while 44% are involved in selling items such as clothes, leather goods and crafts. Only a small percentage supply crafts, and one respondent was welding gates.

Table 7: Main work of foreign traders (n=171)

<i>Type of work</i>	<i>%</i>
Cut hair	32
Sell other (crafts, doilies, accessories, etc.)	18
Sell clothing/shoes/caps	17
Repair/make shoes	15
Sell leather goods	14
Supply crafts	4
Sell food	2
Weld gates	1

Rogerson (1997) notes that there are distinct clusters in the kinds of small businesses operated by foreign entrepreneurs from particular countries. The same appears to be the case with street traders. Forty-four percent of those cutting hair are from the DRC, 19% are Burundians and 11% are Kenyans. Further, 28% of those who make or repair shoes are from the DRC, and a quarter each are from Ghana and Tanzania. The Senegalese dominate two of the sales markets: 45% of those selling clothes, shoes and caps, and 57% of those who sell leather are Senegalese.

The main work of traders seems to differ markedly from the main work that Durban street traders conduct. Findings from the 1997 DRA survey of South African traders in Durban reveal that 47% of local traders sell food items; 20% sell clothing, shoes and hats; 4% repair shoes, and 3% are hairdressers (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997). It seems that foreign traders who are involved in service activities (that is, cutting hair and repairing shoes) are doing work that South African traders are not doing. Even those such as clothes traders, who are selling similar goods, seem to be servicing different market segments. South African clothes traders tend to sell German print work wear or pinafores and second hand clothes, while foreign traders trade in new, often imported and commercially manufactured clothes. These

are not necessarily competing market segments. The main source of economic competition would therefore appear to be over space to operate.

Other income generating activities

About a fifth of the 170 foreign traders have other income generating activities in addition to their primary trading activities. Some (19) own other street trading business – similar or different to their primary business. Others (10) are employed after hours – both in the formal sector (as security guards or in a friend's shop) and in the informal sector (working for another street trader). A few traders (4) sell miscellaneous items, such as sweets, chips and cigarettes, near where they stay. Two traders sew clothes in the evenings. Finally, two respondents revealed that they earn income outside of South Africa.

Length of work time

On average, foreign traders in this sample have been working as traders for 27 months (mean = 26.8). At the time of the 1997 DRA survey, when South African traders were asked when they had started trading from the post that they were trading from, an average of six years was calculated. Rogerson and Peberdy (2001) argue that street trading is often an entry point into the city for foreign traders who later are involved in SMME activities. South African traders often observe that foreigners seem to move onto other economic activities quicker than South Africans do¹⁹.

There seems to be some clustering according to what activities traders are involved in. As table eight indicates, those repairing shoes and selling other items have been doing these activities for many years (up to nine), whereas none of those foreigners who cut hair have been doing this for more than four years.

Table 8: Length of work time by type of work (n=170)

<i>Type of work</i>	<i>Number of years foreign traders have been working</i>								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Cut hair	17	21	11	5	-	-	-	-	-
Sell clothes	7	11	5	3	2	-	-	-	-
Repair shoes	4	11	8	-	-	1	1	-	-
Sell food	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sell leather	4	15	3	1	-	-	-	-	-
Sell other	9	13	4	-	1	-	-	1	2
Supply crafts	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Of the 167 foreign traders who provided both pieces of information, over two-thirds have been doing the same work that they are currently doing, more or less since they arrived in South Africa. Only seven have been doing this work elsewhere before they arrived in the country, while 47 foreign traders (28%) seem to first have done something else before they started trading. This latter group were either initially employed by a formal or informal business, or first worked from home before making enough money to establish their own business, worked their way up from having nothing, or else were unemployed. The issue of process of transition from one activity to the next and whether foreigners demonstrate a greater propensity for this kind of mobility, needs further investigation.

¹⁹ For example, the president of the Informal Trade Management Board, the biggest trader organisation operating in the Durban, identified this as a key difference between South African traders and their foreign counterparts (Interview, 18 June 2001).

Location of foreign traders

According to the manager of street trading in the Informal Trade and Small Opportunities Branch in the City Council (Interview, 10 July 2001), foreign traders have never been given permits to trade in the inner city. Although sympathetic to the position of foreigners, he argued that there was such a backlog of South Africans wanting sites that the city feared an 'explosive situation' if foreigners were granted permits. It can thus be assumed that, other than those who are trading in privately managed flea markets (11% of those interviewed in this survey)²⁰, all other foreign traders operating in the inner city are trading illegally. As is noted later on in the report, foreign traders highlight insecurity with respect to their site as a key concern.

With respect to where the foreign traders in this sample are located, there appear to be three central nodes of activity, as can be seen in figure one (see page 33), namely the City Centre, the Grey/Victoria Street Area, and the Warwick Junction Area.

Work hours

Foreign traders, like South African traders, work long hours. Almost all (96%) work from Monday to Friday, for an average of nearly 10 hours a day. Further, almost all foreign traders (98%) work on a Saturday, for an average of about eight hours. Forty-two percent work on a Sunday, for an average of eight hours, which is somewhat less than approximately half of South African traders who operate on a Sunday (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997). In all, traders work an average of 59 hours per week, which is slightly less than the 64 hours per week found in Rogerson's (1997) study of SMMEs.

Profit earned

It is difficult to assess profit levels of any business, as owners are often reluctant to report this information. Yet, it is particularly difficult to assess profit levels of informal activities. Income in the informal economy is erratic – changing from day to day, month to month, year to year. Informal businesses seldom keep records that reflect these changes. Further, there is often little separation between business income and business expenditure, and business and household expenditure. To get reliable income figures, careful calculations would need to be done with the respondent, with questions designed with the above concerns in mind. Given that this was not the primary focus of the questionnaire, respondents in this survey were simply asked what their profit was on a good week and what their profit was on a bad week. The figures quoted are therefore unlikely to be very accurate, but do give some indication of how these traders are faring.

Bar a few exceptions, profits do not seem to be very high, indicating that these activities are largely of a survivalist nature. As figure two (see page 34) shows, 40% of foreign traders earn profit in a good week of between R101 and R249, while in a bad week 64% earn less than R100.

In figure three (see page 35) it becomes clear which goods or types of work are more profitable than others. Most of the foreigners who cut hair seem to earn the least, while those who repair shoes tend to earn somewhat more. The majority of those who sell clothes seem to do much better, with some of those selling leather also doing relatively well.

²⁰ Flea markets sites are generally much more costly than street sites. For example, the average cost of a site in the Church Walk Market, a fleamarket in the inner city, is R800 a month in comparison to a street trading site which is R35 a month if shelter is provided, and R10 if it is not.

Employment creation

Since the focus in this sample is on those entering the economy rather than more established entrepreneurs, we can expect that employment rates among this sample would not be as high as would be found in small enterprise activities. Of those interviewed one quarter are employing one or more people. This contrasts with only 10% of local street traders who are employing others (May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk, 1997). Not all those who are employing others are employing South Africans. Two thirds (28) of those who employ others are employing one or more South Africans, and 31 of the 54 employees (57%) are South African (11% are unspecified). In table 11 it can be seen that the non-South Africans employed come mainly from the country of origin of the foreign trader, which demonstrates that migrant networks are strongly in place.

Table 9: Country of employer by nationality of employee (n=54)

Nationality of employee	Country of origin of employer												
	Ang	Bur	DR C	Gha	Ken	Moz	Nig	Rwa	Sen	SLe	Som	Mali	Zam
ANG	1												
BUR		2											
DRC			5										
KEN					1								
MOZ						1							
NIG							1						
RWA								1					
SEN									3				
ZIM										1			
SOM											1		
SA	2	4	7			2			9		3	3	1
Unspecified				1					5*				
	3	6	12	1	1	3	1	1	17	1	4	3	1

*from Senegal and South Africa

From table 10 it is clear that fewer non-SADC traders employ South Africans than those from SADC countries. Also, more of those traders who are here for political reasons seem to employ South Africans than those who have come to South Africa for economic reasons. Since the majority of traders here for political reasons and from SADC countries potentially have a right to be here, this is encouraging in terms of local job creation and the sustainability thereof.

Table 10: Percentage of foreign traders who employ South Africans (n=54)

Nationality of employee	Region of foreign trader		Status of foreign trader	
	SADC (%)	Non-SADC (%)	Political (%)	Economic (%)
South African	63	54	60	52
Non-South African	37	29	40	19
Doesn't say	-	17	-	29

Those employed have been working for an average of 12 months each (mean=11.8 months). Of those who are employing others, 71% employ others who sell (either at the same location or at another location), 14% employ porters/packers, 12% employ others to cut hair (either at the same location or at another location), and 7% employ others to repair shoes. In one case a trader was employing three people - to sew, do welding work and to buy supplies. Clearly some skills are being transferred. Geyevu (1997) found that over half of self-employed Ghanaians in Durban had trained employees in shoe repairs, barbering, hairdressing and dressmaking.

South Africans appear to have a bad reputation among foreign traders. In more than one instance foreign traders, particularly those from Senegal, mentioned that they would employ someone from their home country instead of a South African, as they considered their 'homeboys' to have the ability to work hard: "Anyone who can sell, but he must be a Senegal[ese] man because South Africans are lazy". Rogerson (1997) also found that South Africans were thought to be as hard working employees.

6.6 Supply relations

In non-service trades, particularly the apparel (clothes, shoes and caps) and the leather goods trade, foreigners (throughout the country) often sell similar types of goods. This leads to interesting questions about supply relations. Detailed information about sourcing relations, however, is often very sensitive and in many cases would require qualitative and often anthropological research techniques. We did ask respondents how they found their suppliers, where they sourced their goods from and what their relationship with their suppliers was like. Although there are still issues which could be clarified, this has provided useful information.

Over half (60%) of the foreign traders used migrant links to find their suppliers, again reinforcing the importance of social networks. This kind of assistance appears to occur more frequently among certain nationalities - nearly 70% of Senegalese traders, 60% of Burundians, 42% of Mozambicans and 40% of Congolese found their supplies in this way. Interestingly, over two-thirds of those who used migrant links were from non-SADC countries. Moreover, the use of migrant links was more common in certain types of work: 62% of those who sell clothes, caps and shoes, 57% of those selling leather, and 63% of those selling other items used migrant links to obtain their goods.

Only 18% of respondents have international suppliers. Table 11 indicates the types of goods obtained from other countries.

Table 11: Types of goods from African countries (n=16)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Other*</i>	<i>Supply crafts</i>	<i>Clothes, caps, shoes</i>
Angola	-	1	-
Burundi	-	1	-
DRC	4	1	-
Kenya	3	1	-
Malawi	1	1	-
Mali	3	-	-
Mozambique	1	1	1
Tanzania	2	-	-
Zimbabwe	3	-	-

* Other includes doilies, wood carvings, watches, jewellery, tablecloths/curtains

Note: foreign traders have in some instances more than one country of supply

The majority (85%) of traders source their goods in South Africa. Fifty-nine percent were found to have suppliers in Durban, indicating backward linkages into other parts of Durban's economy. Figure four (see page 36) indicates which parts of the city these suppliers are located in. Forty-four percent of respondents have suppliers in another South African city, mostly Johannesburg and, to a lesser extent, Pietermaritzburg.

Interestingly, almost two-thirds of those who sell clothes, shoes and leather goods have suppliers in Durban. Further, almost all (96%) of those who sell these items also have suppliers in other South African cities – 26 in Johannesburg, six in Pietermaritzburg and one in East London. Only one trader who sells these types of goods has an international supplier – in Mozambique. Sixty-two percent of those selling these items note that they found their suppliers through migrant links.

The majority of traders said they had a good relationship with their suppliers, with eighty-two percent of respondents noting that they got a good deal from their suppliers.

The issue of supply relations still remains a key area for further research, and raises a number of questions. Are there central sourcing agents? Where are they located? Few South African traders appear to have gained access to these suppliers, therefore to what extent (if at all) are South Africans involved in these supply networks? What are the barriers to entry? Is the supply of certain goods dominated by certain nationalities? A particularly controversial trading segment is that of fake branded items with labels such as Nike, Reebok and Diesel. Are these goods being illegally imported from the East, or are they being manufactured in South Africa? Are goods like the leather accessories being made in South Africa or elsewhere?

6.7 Obstacles to growth of trading activities

Traders were asked to list the three main obstacles to growing their businesses. The majority of foreign traders face difficulties in their trading activities, and only seventeen percent said that they experienced no obstacles. Figure five (pg 39) shows the main types of obstacles experienced by foreign traders. As can be seen, the lack of recognition as economic actors was the most frequently mentioned obstacle. Traders phrased this in various ways – they complained of having no permit to operate, no right to a site, no permanent site, no papers to do business legitimately or no identification document to expand their choices. *“If we can be given an opportunity to explore our talent in South Africa I will be happy”, “Let foreigners be given a chance ... to contribute in the economy of the country”, “Even if we are business minded, there is nothing we can do because we are not allowed to operate”, and “Local government officials must give foreigners a chance to demonstrate their skills”.* Comments reveal that this lack of recognition results in considerable frustration, and the possibility of recourse to other forms of illegal income generation: *“We are not allowed to do business in South Africa which actually results in many foreigners trafficking drugs”.*

Later on in the questionnaire traders were asked to make recommendations to local government. One of the most frequent requests was for local government officials to grant foreigners permits to trade. *“Local government officials have to look at the contribution made by foreigners to the South African economy and relax some restrictions ... by granting them papers which allow them to do business here”, and “The main problem is about getting permits. You see, if we do not have them the police harass us and bribe us. So we need permits”.* There was also a request for permits to work, which falls within the Department of Home Affairs domain. *“Can the local government negotiate so that me and the other DRC people can get employment in what we are qualified to do?”*

Police harassment was also frequently noted as an obstacle: *“Police are hitting me and take my goods for free”; “Police sometimes come and destroy or take my stock” and “Trouble by the police as they harass me and ask for a selling permit which I do not have. Then they fine me about R100”.* This type of harassment is linked to foreigners having no permits to operate legally. Metro Police in the inner city are periodically instructed to remove those who are trading without a permit. Metro police are entitled to confiscate the goods of traders who are operating without a permit and to fine them. Once traders have paid a fine their goods should be returned to them. Aside from traders not being able to access permits in the first place, what is problematic here is the accusations of violence and goods being

destroyed. Further, in a number of cases, respondents accused the police of demanding bribes in return for allowing them to trade.

A fifth of the foreign traders surveyed complain of a lack of street-trader infrastructure: *"It is difficult for us to get shelters since we do not have permits", "Heavy rain forces us to close"*. Crime is also considered a serious obstacle: *"Sometimes ... people around here or those who are passing by intimidate us and demand our money", and "Criminals come and take our money since they know that we do not have access to banks"*. Interestingly, 18% of political migrants as opposed to 10% of economic migrants noted crime as an obstacle. This is in line with McDonald, Mashike and Golden's national survey (1999), in which it was found that refugees are most likely to have been victims of crime. Interestingly a number of foreigners specifically noted xenophobia as a problem with respect to their business: *"Most people discriminate [against] us", "Xenophobia coupled with drunken criminals affects our business", and "South Africans sometimes threaten to kick us out of our business"*.

There appear to be trends with respect to what goods traders are selling. Forty percent of those who cut hair complain of competition as an obstacle. In addition, two thirds of those who sell clothes, shoes and caps say that they experience police harassment, while about half of those who sell leather goods say the same. Interestingly, 19 of the 35 Senegalese complain of police harassment, while only three of the 40 traders from the DRC state this as an obstacle. It seems that some nationalities are experiencing more harassment than others, and that this is tied to the goods that they sell. This obstacle is also noted more in some places than in others. Forty percent of those in the Centre/Fleamarket complain of police harassment. Respondents commented that some parts of town are worse than others in terms of being bribed. Traders in the Warwick area particularly are less likely to be bribed.

Many of the obstacles faced by foreign traders seem to be similar to those experienced by South African street traders. Lund, Nicholson and Skinner (2000) note that the lack of reasonably priced and convenient overnight storage for goods, the lack of shelter at trading sites, overtrading, unhygienic conditions caused by the lack of proper sanitation at trading sites, and high levels of crime against street traders and their customers, are all factors that have a negative impact on the business of local traders. The problem of theft and criminal violence was identified in May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk's (1997) study as the biggest obstacle faced by South African traders to their businesses in the Durban metropolitan area. In Rogerson's (1997) study, the main obstacles were as follows, in order of priority: (1) access to finance or credit, (2) problems with permits and customs, (3) police harassment and problems with local officials, and (4) crime. While foreign entrepreneurs experience difficulties in accessing credit, foreign traders in Durban complain about not being able to access more basic financial services such as savings facilities.

6.8 Perceptions of success of trading activities

Traders were asked whether they felt their businesses were successful or not, and why this was the case. As is indicated in Table 12, over half (58%) of respondents said that their economic activities were 'good' or 'okay' or successful, a fifth (21%) felt that business fluctuated, and a final fifth (21%) felt that their trading activities were not successful. The issue of survival featured in a high proportion of responses. Some of those who said their businesses were successful said that this was because they were able to survive - *"I am managing to get money to buy food and pay the*

rent. Sometimes I even get money for clothes". A number of those who felt that their businesses were not a success said this was because they could *only* survive – "I am just surviving".

Table 12: Reason for success or not of foreign traders' economic activities (n=165)

Reason	Yes (%)	Successful	
		No (%)	Sometimes (%)
Demand for the product	24	-	6
Location	20	6	6
Survive	20	14	6
Potential to accumulate	11	6	-
Business fluctuates	10	6	63
Business strategy	6	-	-
Low demand	-	34	6
No permit	-	6	3
No credit	-	3	-
Competition	-	23	6
Xenophobia	-	3	-
Other	3	3	-

Those who felt their business was a success attribute this to the fact that there is demand for their product or service, the location of their trading activities, the fact that they are able to survive on the profits made, and in some cases accumulate profits and grow their businesses. Some foreigners note that they are successful because of their business strategy. Interestingly one respondent noted that: "*Most people come to buy from us because they know we negotiate*".

There appear to be trends according to the activities traders are involved in. Figure six (page 38) indicates to what extent foreign traders involved in various types of work consider their economic activities to be a success. As can be seen, the majority of those who repair shoes consider their activities to be a success, while only a minority of those who cut hair feel the same: "*It is not desirable to have hair cut on the street*". Almost two-thirds (63%) of the foreign traders who did not believe they were successful in their trading activities, cut hair. The majority of those who sell leather goods consider themselves to be doing well. However only about half of those who sell clothes, fewer even than those who sell other items, consider their trading activities to be a success.

A number of traders noted that business fluctuated – there were periods when business was better than others. Not surprisingly, the majority of these foreign traders attribute this to the fact that the trading activities that they are involved in are seasonal, as can be seen in table 12. From table 12 it is evident that most of those who claim they are not successful in their economic activities experience low demand and too much competition. Others noted issues such as lack of a permit, access to credit and xenophobia. Some claim that business in general has deteriorated over time: "*Selling was good when I came here in 1997, but now it is going down*".

6.9 Foreign traders' experiences of life in Durban

Where foreign traders live

The foreign traders in this study live in certain distinct parts of the city, with those from the same countries tending to live in the same areas. As can be seen in figure

seven (page 39), just over a third of the foreign traders surveyed live in the Point area, slightly less than a third (32%) live in Albert Park, while about 22% live in the CBD. Most noteworthy is the fact that only two respondents live in the former townships – one in Umlazi and one in KwaMashu. This is despite the fact that rentals are much higher in the inner city. Those who were questioned about this noted that they feared for their lives in township areas, not only because of crime but also xenophobia. What often happens is that one foreigner will take the lease on an inner city flat and then sublet space. Because inner city rentals are relatively high, there are often many people living in one flat. This overcrowding has been a source of concern for a number of local government departments.

Foreign traders from the same countries seem to live in similar areas. Most of those from the DRC and from Zimbabwe live in Albert Park, while the Senegalese seem to be located in the CBD and in the Point. A large proportion of Burundians, Tanzanians and Nigerians are also located in the Point.

Access to services

Seventy one percent of traders claimed they did not have problems in accessing state services such as health care. This is likely to be an underestimate. As interviewers point out, 'no' means many things. With regard to access to health care, for instance, it was clear that many respondents had not tried to access state hospitals – they did not know where they were or they were scared to use them. One respondent described how he used a private doctor instead of state health care because: *"I've heard stories of people who have tried to do so and they found themselves being deported"*.

Table 13 shows that the majority of those foreign traders who acknowledge having problems in using state services experience difficulties with health care. These difficulties range from having to wait long hours for service, to being treated differently by nurses when they do receive treatment: *"The only time that I went to hospital the nurses gave priority to local people. I was only attended very late"*. At times this discrimination could have potentially negative consequences, as one instance highlights: *"My home boy was stabbed. We could not get help since he is a foreigner. The only choice was to go to a private doctor"*. There is a particular need for these informal traders to be able to access health care. As one respondent noted: *"We must have access to hospitals because we do not have shelters... we are vulnerable to the cold and the rain disturbs us"*.

Traders also noted problems with accessing financial services. The following comments were noted: *"Not having access to banks makes us use money carelessly because we have no place to save it"*, *"Criminals come and take our money since they know that we do not have access to banks"*. And finally a request to local government: *"Open some facilities in which we can be able to bank our money and open channels which can allow us to send money to our families"*.

Table 13: Problems in accessing state services (n=49)

<i>Services</i>	<i>%</i>
Health care	92
Finance	18
Safety and security	14
Home affairs	12
Education	8
Other	2

Foreigners also complained about a lack of police protection. Two respondents for example said: *“They broke into my apartment and stole my stuff. When I went to report the case the police told me that I am a foreigner, they will deport me”*, and *“They [local government] have to see to it that criminals are arrested because it is difficult for us to chase them and report them to the police since we are foreigners”*. One of the frequent requests to local government officials is for protection from the police: *“We need protection from government against police”*, and *“The only thing I can say to the local officials is that they must control their police people. They take the little money that we are trying to save. Instead they should protect us from the thugs that [are] milking us”*.

Home Affairs was also noted as a problem. There were also calls for access to education, although this was not frequently cited: *“Government officials must open opportunities for us to proceed with the education we were pursuing back home because it was not our choice to be foreigners here”*.

Other problems

Respondents were asked what additional problems they faced. About a third of the foreign traders state that they have experienced no additional problems. The fact that this figure is fairly high is partly attributable to the strong social networks that exist, as the following comment outlines: *“No problems, my friends have always been there for me”*. On the other hand, there are those that genuinely do not seem to experience difficulties: *“I can’t say much because I do not have problems with my business and my life”*.

Those traders who did have further problems identified a number of issues. These are listed in Table 14.

Table 14: Other problems experienced by foreign traders (n=110)

<i>Type of problem</i>	<i>%</i>
Language	37
Xenophobia	33
Police harassment/lack of protection	31
Accommodation	20
No access to employment	15
Cost of living	12
No permit	5
Other	11

A large number of traders reported having difficulties with language – either not being able to speak English or not being able to speak Zulu. *“I could not communicate with other people ... I did not know how to cope”*, *“I speak French, so sometimes I cannot communicate with the customers. I have a similar problem with my suppliers. But I try”* and *“People shout at me because I cannot speak Zulu”*. This difficulty is experienced by more political (34%) than economic (17%) of migrants.

Further, a third of respondents complain of xenophobia from South Africans. *“Black foreigners are not treated like white foreigners in South Africa. Most of the South Africans call us names and we are treated like animals”*, *“We are not treated with dignity. Everyone sees a cheap labourer when they see us foreigners. Our education, skills and talents are ignored”*, and *“The problem is with the attitude from the black South Africans who call us names. They say we are taking their jobs and their wives”*. The experience is so acute that government officials are called on to play a part in

changing attitudes towards foreigners, a call which the Immigration Bill echoes: “(We) need government ... to educate its people to be friendly to us”. Notably, 27% of those traders in South Africa for political reasons, contrasted with 19% of traders who are here for economic reasons encounter xenophobia as a noteworthy problem in their lives. This ties in with one of McDonald, Mashike and Golden’s (1999) findings, that refugees are much more likely to say that they are perceived negatively in South Africa.

As outlined above, and reiterated here, a considerable number of foreign traders have problems with the police. The police are accused of not helping when a crime is reported, of harassing foreigners and in some cases of being corrupt. “*Police harass us at our flats*”, “*Police give us problems because they are broke. They come to us because they know we are soft targets*”, “*Police officers are enriching themselves through us. They make us pay them to avoid being deported*”, and “*Police ask us for cold drink money*”.

Problems in accessing accommodation and the high cost of accommodation were also noted. “*I also struggled to get a flat here because I could not produce relevant documents*”, “*The rent at our flat is too high and sometimes I do not make enough to feed myself*”, and “*It [local government] must talk to flat owners not to charge us so much*”. Other problems that were noted were foreigners not being able to access other employment opportunities, and a more general comment about the cost of living. Once again the issue of not having a permit to legally trade was raised.

Improvement or decline in lifestyle of foreign traders

Traders were asked whether the move to South Africa had resulted in an improvement or a decline in their lifestyle. Just over half of the respondents said that there had been an improvement: “*Being here has improved my life, money-wise, socially and politically*”. In some cases this is not saying very much as people are fleeing from war: “*Yes, because there is peace*” and “*There are no wars like in my country*”. Interestingly the level of satisfaction seems to be lower than that found in the national survey, where three quarters of respondents commented that ‘overall conditions’ in South Africa are better than their home country (McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999). This is likely to be because our sample is concentrating on those involved in survivalist activities and so is registering a particularly poor group of people. Sixty two percent of foreign traders who had left their countries for economic reasons said that their lifestyle had improved, and only 46% of those who had left for political reasons could say the same.

Forty-one percent of foreign traders said that their lifestyle had either declined or remained the same as it was in their home country. Traders represented this in a variety of ways: “*From being a teacher to selling on the street is a shame*”. Some traders gave reasons for why it had resulted in a decline: “*It has resulted in a decline because of the inhospitality I get in South Africa*” and “*I have to pay fines to the police*”. Others were more positive: “*So far it has resulted in a decline in my lifestyle, but I do have a hope as my business is still young*”.

6.10 Ties to home country

Visiting home

Traders were asked if, since their initial arrival they had returned home to visit. Nearly all (87%) of those interviewed have never returned home. This is despite the fact that most (78%) respondents have family in their home countries, specifically about two-thirds of those who left for political reasons, and almost all (95%) of those

who left for economic reasons. As can be expected only 4% of political migrants visited home, while 22% of economic migrants did so. A number of respondents expressed the desire to visit their home countries, but were fearful of not being let into the country again: *“I don’t [go back] because it is difficult to enter the country. If I leave I may not come back”*.

Those who did return home were asked how frequently they had visited and if they had taken goods with them. Table 15 indicates that of the 23 who do return home, nine have returned once since their arrival, three have returned once a year since their arrival, two have returned two to three times a year since their arrival, three note that they return ‘frequently’ or often, and one does not state how often he returns. Five of the foreigners return home every month – they are cross-border traders. Just over half (57%) of those who return home, buy goods to take home, although it is not clear whether these goods are used for trade or not. They buy clothes, groceries and other items.

Table 15: Goods bought to take home across frequency of return (n=23)

<i>Frequency of return</i>	<i>Buy goods to take home</i>			
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Doesn’t state</i>
Once since arrival	9	3	3	3
Once a year since arrival	3	3	-	-
Two or three times a year	2	1	1	-
Every month	5	4	1	-
Frequently/often	3	2	1	-
Doesn’t specify how frequently	1	-	1	-

Sending money home

Just under a third (30%) of these foreign traders send money home, compared to 55% in the national survey (McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999). This difference can be attributed to the fact that they do not earn enough money to do so: *“I do not send any money as I do not make much money”*. In fact, some foreign traders even state that their families send them money. Of those who disclosed the amount they sent home (44), an average of R151.16 per month was recorded. This is far lower than the average of R345 per month found in the national survey (McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999).

6.11 Future intentions

Contrary to popular perceptions, the majority of foreign traders do not intend to stay in South Africa permanently.

Table 16: Foreigner’s future intentions

<i>Future intentions</i>	<i>%</i>
Return home	52
Stay here/in South Africa	36
Depends on what happens here/there	7
Personal/other reason	1
No future plans/unsure/question not applicable*	4

* The question was considered not applicable to cross-border traders who are continually moving in and out of the country

As table 16 indicates, just over half of respondents want to return to their home countries. Respondents gave wanting to continue their career or education and to reunite with their family, as reasons for wanting to return home. Almost two-thirds of those who want to return left their country for political reasons. Many political migrants were waiting for conflicts to end in their home country: *"I pray that the war ends so that I can go back home and reunite with my family"*. Many pleaded with the South African government to assist in this regard: *"Mandela must help, if he stops the war I will return back home. I miss my family"*, *"I want your government to help us to end the war [in DRC]"*, and *"Please speak to our government to end the war [in DRC]"*. The fact that over three-quarters of these foreign traders have family in their countries of origin can be considered to be an incentive to return home. Indeed, just over half of those who have family in their home country want to return home. Only six of the total of 171 foreign traders want to bring their family to this country.

Just over a third of the foreign traders want to stay here: *"My future plans are to get a South African ID and settle permanently in South Africa"*. Interestingly, 61% of those who want to stay in South Africa left their countries for economic reasons. These traders cited economic push factors (*"the economic situation is bad in my home country"*) or economic incentives to stay (*"I want to continue my business here"* and *"I want to make this business big"*). Some said that they wanted to see if they could be a success in South Africa and if not they would find another country. Others said that they have no family in their home country, therefore there is no incentive to return. Finally, some stated that they wanted to stay so that they could obtain an education of some sort.

Seven percent of traders say that their future plans depend on what develops either here or in their home country. *"Yes [I want to return to my home country] depending on the political situation back home"*, *"If I can generate enough money here I will go back and open a big business"*. Four percent of the foreign traders have no future plans, are unsure, or feel the question is not applicable because they cross in and out of South Africa.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The trends of globalisation and regionalisation indicate that cross border migration is not going to stop. Moreover, the specific political and economic context in sub-Saharan Africa dictates that South Africa is likely to be the recipient of an ongoing flow of both documented and undocumented foreigners. It has been argued that national government provides little guidance to local government about how to respond to the growing numbers of foreigners trying to make a living in South African cities. It is, however, at a local level that government has to make some hard decisions. Should foreigners be granted trading sites? Should the specific needs of groups of traders like the haircutters be incorporated into urban design? Should foreigners be allowed to access support facilities? Up to now Durban's response had tended to be *ad hoc*. The Council has responded to crises when they have emerged, for example by dissipating conflicts between foreign street traders and their local counterparts. Foreigners have not been granted trading sites for fear of the response from certain local traders. The fact that the new Informal Economy Policy is acknowledging the issue of foreign street traders is however encouraging. In this section we explore some ideas about more coherent, proactive policy response at a local level.

The survey demonstrated that foreign street traders in inner city Durban are not a homogenous group – they come from many different countries, for different reasons, and have different legal status. Some intend to stay in South Africa, many do not. Policy responses should acknowledge this heterogeneity. From a policy perspective there are a number of relevant divisions. First, there are those foreigners who have been granted refugee status, which gives them the right to work. As the Informal Economy Policy (2001:9) points out, “where visitors have the right to work, it would be unconstitutional to deny them the right to a place in which to work.” Durban needs to reconsider its stance of not allowing any foreigners access to trading sites.²¹

Second, there are asylum seekers. Guidance from national government with respect to this group is less clear. Asylum seekers are allowed into the country to apply for refugee status but are not granted the right to work, nor are they given any state assistance while their application is being processed. As previously pointed out, this process can take between one and three years. In the period that they are awaiting the outcome of their application, asylum seekers are likely to work in the segments of the labour market where barriers to entry are low – in activities like street trading. Although direct questions were not asked about legal status in this survey, approximately half of those interviewed had come to South Africa for political reasons. Some are likely to have refugee status. More, however, are likely to be asylum seekers. There is a strong humanitarian argument for making provision for this group. With respect to reasons for coming to South Africa there are clusters according to activity. For example, over three quarters of haircutters (an activity for which there is a demand and one which few South Africans are involved in) are here for political reasons. An example of a proactive response would be for the City to make specific provisions for haircutters, which would minimise conflict about space between foreigners and their South African counterparts.

Third, there are cross border traders. Although not many cross border traders were included in this sample, Peberdy and Crush's (1998) work demonstrates how important these traders are to the craft industry in other parts of the country and show how traders invest the majority of their profits in South Africa. Key informant

²¹ It is acknowledged that there are accusations of false documentation. In allocating sites to refugees, local government would have to liaise with Home Affairs to verify the validity of this documentation.

interviews confirmed that this was the case in Durban, and also indicated that a lot of South African craft traders are sourcing their goods from foreigners. Craft is an important aspect of the tourism industry in Durban. The Self Employed Women's Union has suggested that a suppliers market be built to accommodate these craft sellers, arguing that this would dissipate conflict. This proposal needs further exploration.

Fourth, there are those who are here for economic reasons. Forty-seven percent of those interviewed in this survey said they were here for economic reasons. From the perspective of the current national legislation, this is the group that can least easily be accommodated by local government. There is however some differentiation within the group of economic migrants that is important to delineate. Given current deliberations within the SADC region, migrants coming from SADC may well, in the future, be accorded added rights over others. Of those who have left for economic reasons, 41% are from the SADC region and 59% are non-SADC migrants. With respect to economic migrants, Rogerson's (1998:150) point is particularly pertinent: 'The credibility of arguments for halting non-South Africans from trading ... is severely undermined by the expansion into neighbouring countries of the operations of a number of large South African retailing chains, including Woolworths, Shoprite Checkers and OK.' He goes on to highlight the contradiction between South African businesses opening stores and selling South African products in neighbouring countries whilst the traders from these surrounding states are hounded off the streets. This again highlights national government's tendency to treat small and big business differently.

As current legislation stands, traders who are here for purely economic reasons are illegally in the country and therefore cannot be granted access to public space. Yet it is unlikely that these traders are going to go away. What needs to be debated is the extent they can be incorporated into training and support programmes. These are the traders who tend to be doing better than others - clothing and leather goods traders - and are therefore the traders that South Africans would be most likely to learn from.

It is clear from the survey that there are problematically high levels of xenophobia. Many traders raised this as an issue both when asked about obstacles to business growth and how they experienced living in Durban. As noted in section 6.9, over a third of respondents cited xenophobia as a problem. Some respondents particularly asked local government to address this issue. One respondent for example said "(We want local government to) *teach its people to understand our problems and treat us like human beings*". This is reinforced by the fact that despite high rentals, 169 out of the 171 traders interviewed, lived in the inner city. One of the main reasons cited for not living in suburban areas was fear due to xenophobia. Through the research process it also became clear that there are xenophobic attitudes among local government officials and councillors. Local government could play a proactive role in information dissemination about the issue of foreigners living in South Africa. Concerted attempts should be made to confront and counter myths and misinformation. Local traders need to be aware of the fact that there is much variation among foreign traders. They need to attempt to understand what it means to be a refugee and an asylum seeker, as well as the rights that are respectively accorded to these people. Local government could also provide conflict prevention and resolution training for both South African and foreign traders. Local government should work alongside NGO's on these issues.

Key informants also highlighted the importance of closing the disparities between South African and foreign traders as a means of reducing conflict between the two

groups. This entails improving access to support services for South African traders. Skinner (2000b) found that there were very few training or financial services available to street traders in the Durban area. This reinforces the importance of a proactive stance from local government with respect to provision of these services. Skills exchanges between foreign and local traders could also be promoted. One informant pointed to the fact that while South African traders have the competitive advantage of communication and knowing the market they are dealing with, foreign traders often have good business skills and vocational training that in some cases is not available in South Africa. The president of the Informal Trade Management Board (Interview, 18 June 2001), the biggest trader organisation representing South African traders in the Durban area, had a positive response to the idea of such skills exchanges, arguing that this would be a good way of building relationships between South Africans and their foreign counterparts. He did however highlight the importance of local government playing a mediating and facilitating role.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the accusations of harassment from Metro Police. In some cases Metro Police would be in their rights to be confiscating goods – traders who are operating illegally or selling counterfeit goods. There are however a number of respondents who claim that the police are bribing them. This needs further investigation. *Ad hoc* responses from Metro Police are largely an upshot of an unclear policy environment. This reinforces the importance of local government having a policy position on this issue.

There are a number of different departments within local government that deal with foreigners – the Informal Trade Department, City Health, Metropolitan Police and the South African Police Service. Attention needs to be paid to how the activities of these departments can be better co-ordinated and how local government interacts with national government departments like Home Affairs. One idea that has been muted is the establishment of a forum that could meet periodically to discuss issues. Further, since there is little guidance from national government to local government with respect to the issue of how to manage foreigners working in the informal economy, local government should be making its concerns heard in national government forums.

Finally, there remain a number of information gaps. These have been highlighted throughout the report. This survey only provides an insight into one type of economic activity that foreigners are involved in, in one part of the city. Preliminary evidence from research into informal clothing manufacturing, for example, indicates that foreigners play an important role in skills transfer (Skinner, forthcoming). In addition, little is known about foreign small business activities in the city. These are the kinds of issues that need to be addressed before a comprehensive policy response can be formulated.

In conclusion, what this survey does demonstrate is that foreign traders, like their South African counterparts, work hard, for long hours and little remuneration. These are people that have few alternatives, other than crime. What they are calling for, as with their South African counterparts, is recognition as economic actors.

Appendix 1: Further information on cross-border traders

Key informant interviews were conducted with a number of cross-border craft traders in order to supplement information on this group of foreign migrants who are relatively under-represented in the sample. There appear to be three types of traders – those who only sell to the public, those who only supply to other traders and those who do both.

Those who only sell to the public tend to sell at privately run flea markets. According to key informants there are a large group of cross-border traders – apparently a couple of hundred – who come to Durban for the explicit purpose of supplying crafts. They either supply South African traders or sell their goods to South African middlemen who in turn supply traders or formal businesses. A Malawian trader (Interview, 20/07/2001) supplies between ten and twenty South African middlemen, depending on the goods he brings with him. A lot of these traders bring unfinished crafts that they then 'finish off' – polish, sandpaper and refine - during their stay here. In some cases South Africans are employed. A Zimbabwean supplier (Interview, 20/07/2001) employs four South African women on a part-time basis to sandpaper wooden giraffes that he brings with him as he does not have the time to do so within the duration of his stay. The traders who supply crafts to local traders and sell their goods directly to the public are the most controversial. On the Durban Beachfront, for example, there has been considerable tension between South African and some foreign traders because of this. South African traders claim that their very own suppliers are undercutting them. An interview (20/07/2001) with two Zimbabwean cross border traders confirmed that this did happen.

All traders interviewed buy goods in South Africa. Traders either reported that they bought groceries and items for personal use or that they bought goods to sell back home. There is a tendency for cross-border traders to use some of the money made here to buy beadwork from local suppliers, as it is not widely available in some of their home countries. Other migrants reported taking orders in their home countries for electrical appliances, clothes, blankets and miscellaneous items, which are not easily available there.

All of the cross-border traders note that the favourable exchange rate features high among their reasons for doing this work, but include high costs of transport and customs duties as obstacles to growing their businesses. None of the suppliers interviewed have been trained in making these crafts. While some only have schooling, others, particularly those who solely supply, have tertiary education, but have left their professions after identifying a gap in the market and an opportunity to earn more in this profession. All the cross-border traders interviewed claim to have visitor visas which enable them to enter legally into the country for limited periods of time – usually two or three weeks – before they are required to return home.

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Figure 1: Location of foreign traders




Figure 2: Profit earned by foreign traders




Figure 3: Profit in a good week by type of work





Figure 4: Location of suppliers in Durban

Figure 5: Obstacles to foreigner’s trading activities




Figure 6: Rating of success of each type of work




Figure 7: Where foreign trader's live

