CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA:
AN INTRODUCTION

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While development studies proliferate as a subject for study, the nature of what
development is, or might be, has faded into the background. It becomes easier to provide
a sunny and essentially moral definition of development that links up to psychological
notions of well-being and health as well as to idealised participatory formulations on
democracy. Development by this token must include everyone including the most
‘disadvantaged’ and it must take everyone forwards in a self-conscious win-win process.
Amartya Sen has seduced us into seeing development,’ real ‘development of course, as a
process which will overcome the unfreedom from which mankind, (that same mankind
which Rousseau discovered in the eighteenth century lay everywhere in chains although
born free) so generally suffers—a ‘momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities’
as he concludes his widely applauded Development as Freedom. (Sen, 1999) This is the
attractive side of so-called neo-liberalism, its emphasis on human rights.

It is a picture that is virtually entirely taken out of any historical framing. As soon as we
ask why and how type questions about development, however, we are very quickly led
back to the real history of capitalism together with its antecedents and its broader context.
Any serious economic historian cannot but also consider the dark side of capitalism’s rise.
Karl Marx remains the classic protagonist of the view that this emergence was signalled in
blood and tears and mastered by individuals bent on overcoming mores—age-old moral
principles embedded in social belief. At home there was the immensely destructive
process involved in separating cultivators from the land, proletarianisation, by which
means a working class was formed. Overseas commerce involved exploitative exchanges
and at their worst, the slave trade and the revival of slavery under commercial auspices. If
immensely dynamic and capable of fuelling previously unthinkable rapid economic
growth, capitalism was also marked by intensified new class antagonisms and a system of
market-led exploitation. Marx was not especially sentimental about what had preceded
capitalism, but he was certainly aware that there was enormous loss and hardship in its
ruin. Historians such as E.P. Thompson, writing for England (and of course his
innumerable acolytes and followers), have powerfully captured ‘the world we have lost’ in
deepening our grasp of the economic macro-processes. (Thompson, 1963) Why should
these losses just be consigned to a half-forgotten past? Does not capitalism need to
recreate itself over and over in ways that often mimic its beginnings once profits falter?

Simultaneously however, almost any writer on development is at least dimly aware that
economic development itself is hardly just a simulacrum for economic growth as
measured in raw statistics.¹ Those statistics may be in fact flagging activity within a
limited enclave of marketised activity, the successful mining enterprise or cultivation of a
particular cash crop in some colony, which emerge in a wider context that is superficially
‘traditional’ or ‘unchanging. While obviously allowing some to prosper or create wealth,
such enclaves are too isolated or too focussed on some foreign-generated activity to have
large-scale social and economic effects on a territorial or national economy. Many writers
have pointed to the contrast between Ghana at the time of independence in 1957 and, on
the other side of the world, South Korea, recently coming out of a ferocious and
destructive civil war with heavy international involvement. They both had similar per
capita incomes according to conventional statistical measure. But in Ghana, these incomes
were tied into the wealth based on foreign-owned mines and on the growing of cocoa
trees, whose fruit was at its peak in terms of the prices it fetched. This, together with the
felling of tropical forest, proved to be a very inadequate basis for further accumulation.2
(Amin, 1973) By some measures, Ghana has not advanced much in the subsequent half-
century. By contrast, Korea was beginning a far-reaching national process which has led to
broad-based wealth accumulation as well as the creation of some great fortunes and
dramatic improvement in social indicators for the majority. In classic form, moreover,
Korea has ceased to be a peasant nation and most of its population now live in cities and,
if they are of working age, likely to be represented on a payroll. Industrialisation and
urbanisation have taken over. (Amsden, 1989) The Republic of Korea’s weight in world
affairs is much greater than that of aid-dependent Ghana.

The point here is that, whether or not we term it ‘freedom’, there is a very broad awareness
in this line of thinking that development must involve an economic core but is not
narrowly economic alone. There is some transformational process that Korea has
experienced which Ghana has not. Moreover, and equally importantly, if countries such
as Korea and in their day Japan, Germany, France or Britain ‘developed’, it was a process
that contained suffering as well as ease, loss as well as gain, although certainly some
historic experiences have been less painful than others. Development is not a win-win
situation. There is very little reason to think that further economic changes will not bring
similar wrenching transformations.

To use the word capitalism in this text is not intended to suggest that socialism, state-led
development, is immune to these bittersweet processes. The harsh history of the Soviet
Union was for its time an amazingly rapid process of developmental formation
transforming basic features of the lives of the population that bears this out most acutely.
The processes of industrialisation in post-war east-central Europe (especially the countries
with low living standards and little modern industry previously) and the convulsive
changes going on today in China also make this obvious. In this context, talking about
modernisation or industrialisation might be more justifiable than capitalism, if opener to
different interpretations; these terms were once more frequent and more consistently used
than development, and not without good reason.

In South Africa, given the poverty to which the large majority of blacks were born within
sight of apparent ‘development’ and affluence, it is understandable that people are
reluctant to tabulate the dark side of development in their anxiety to grasp the good things
of life as held out; most articulate commentators very much want to hold onto an idealised
notion of the past—in indigenous knowledge, so-called ubuntu—and imagine that it can
cohere to development. Writers who are broadly critical of the ideology and practice of
development are of interest to only a few and their critiques unfortunately passed over far
too readily. A rare exception, however, with can be superficially taken as merely a critique of development hucksterism but actually runs deeper, infuses the work of perhaps black South Africa’s most eminent living writer Zakes Mda. (Mda, 2000) Mda explores wittily and observantly the foibles of development, South African style.

This book, which does not aspire to any easy fix on attaining ‘development’, wants to introduce the subject to students especially by proposing that development is a process, not an event, and it is fraught with failures, with tension and with loss as well as gain, in South Africa as much as elsewhere. It also wishes to remind readers that it has been a historic process and its particular characteristics have a great bearing on the present still, both because of the consequences of the past still with us and because patterns of accumulation in the South African economy are often still ploughing the furrows laid down during its classic period of industrialisation. This is not an anti-development account, however. Without seeing modernisation as a painless or contradiction-free process, it essentially does advocate unashamedly for a process of modernisation that runs deeper than what has been so far promoted. It leans towards seeing exclusion from change as being worse than participation and tries to promote participation on as wide as possible a basis.

It does mean as well to open up debate on what a genuine transformation, not merely an exchange in the racial leadership of the society or a disastrous slump fired up by chauvinistic racial nationalism as in contemporary Zimbabwe, might be like in South Africa. This introduction is not really the place to debate those processes in detail but it seeks at least to restore to importance a few major ideas which must govern such a transformation.

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We might start with President Thabo Mbeki’s well-known 2003 speech reinserting economic dualism as the chief way of understanding South African society. Here he proclaimed the existence of two distinct South African economies. On the one hand, there is a reasonably well-educated, dynamic, adaptive society that is well situated for further advance in the global division of labour. This society remains largely, if no longer entirely, white, a point he thinks of the greatest importance. Then there is the large world of poverty, exclusion and humiliation which remains the lot of most, if far from all, blacks: the ‘second economy’. (Hirsch, 2005)

Mbeki here essentially revives the dualist approach which dominated the vision of critical liberal economists in the apartheid era. (Houghton, 1969 or, for a subtler interpretation, Nattrass, 1981) At some level, this is the common wisdom everyone sees and senses if they walk South African earth. There is the temptation to compartmentalise two historical processes entirely, one successful and normal and one unsuccessful and diseased, and to see South Africa’s problem as one of ‘uplift’ where well-meaning social transfers will take the second economy up the lift to the level of the first.

But what is the relationship between the two economies? The radical critique starting with the late 1960s aimed at dismantling dualism entirely. In a particular moment which helped
to define the launching of that critique, the late Harold Wolpe raised this connection. Cheap labour, propped up through the maintenance of a section of rural South Africa along so-called tribal lines, was precisely what fed and made possible the systematic, profitable pursuit of deep-level mining which in turn provided the capital which was applied to the creation of a modern state and directly and indirectly fed the industrialisation of South Africa through the first half of the twentieth century. It was the migrant labour system, especially on the mines, which established this connection. Wolpe, however, argued that rural South Africa was becoming less and less capable of sustaining cheap labour paid below reproduction level. In his view this is why apartheid was instituted under the National Party government, determined to preserve whites only rule intact: that is to say that Bantustans replete with subaltern elites and development policies needed to be created in the hopes of propping up the system and keeping blacks in large numbers at a distance from the cities. (Wolpe, 1972) It would not be unreasonable to see this as the most stimulating and important idea in the development of sociology in South Africa up to that time and much of what follows has essentially been a commentary.

There are many qualifications and ramifications which have been explored that follow along these lines but for the purposes of this introduction, four alone will be mentioned. First, rural South Africa was categorised not only by land left to African communal ownership and the stewardship of chiefs, most of it was in fact owned by whites who relied on pre-capitalist social relationships, what can be called-- as long as we realise that the kindly associations with the word need to be largely removed as-- paternalism. While wages have increasingly entered into those relationships, as Schirmer & Böhm in this volume suggest, they have never entirely replaced older ways of organising life on the land. The legal basis for them was in some respects removed during the segregation and apartheid years but only entirely since 1994 and not with the practical effects intended. Indeed even in South African cities, African townships were administered along authoritarian lines that echoed the rural model, a pattern which broke down fairly definitively in the 1980s but has yet to be replaced with a vibrant local government system.

Second, political scientists have been particularly indebted to the polemical volume written by Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, which has placed the duality of South African life on a somewhat different plane. In particular, Mamdani makes clear to us that once modified to provide a cheap and reliable system of law and order, the Bantustan system and its predecessors was not merely a way to rule South Africa but one that had profound implications for the social system and the way individuals conceived their relationship to the wider society. His fears that the ramifications of dualism could sink the liberation project of the 1980s were fortunately not borne out but big problems remain. For Mamdani, the question of how to transform subjects into citizens has been fundamental to his understanding of the problems of post-colonial Africa and post-apartheid South Africa. It is not difficult to move a step towards the inference that it is only citizens who are going to make the transition to a different and more prosperous way of life. The assumptions about ‘development’ in fact are about the creation of citizens. In this volume, Siwisa conceptualises problems of
development implementation specifically in terms of the lack or breakdown of what he calls social citizenship.

The other points to be drawn here are more directly economic. Thirdly, there is the hypothesis, associated with the work of Ben Fine and Zav Rustomjee exactly contemporaneous with Mamdani, that South African economic development is governed economically by the logic of a ‘minerals-energy complex’ largely internalised by the state. While the effective large scale mining and processing of minerals required an infrastructure, at the technical heart of which lay the generation and application of large quantities of cheap energy, primarily derived from coal which has become a more and more important mined commodity itself, this has created a set of connections, forms of dominance and material relationships that define a particular technical growth path within capitalism. Unlike some developing countries, South Africa has never been a very effective producer of consumer commodities and much of its industrialisation has served only the internal market. Development has been paid for and depended on the modalities of deep level mining (and what is required to keep it profitable), other resource-extracting activities, and on the tentacles of the financial empires created by mining operations. (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996)

This brings us to the final, not unconnected point. The MEC has made possible a successful capital accumulation trajectory sustaining a significant middle class while excluding the majority of South Africans from the perspective of all the conventional human resource indicators. If we look at South African development from the point of view of education and skills, it ranks amazingly poorly; this in turn relates to what is frequently pointed out, the extreme inequality of the society especially measuring the bottom half of the population by most indicators against the top decile (tenth) or two. For succinctness and elegance in understanding this dire situation, readers can turn to Charles Feinstein’s recent economic history and to Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass’ systematic and economically informed historical sociology. (Feinstein, 2005; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005) Feinstein points to the serious negative implications of this kind of growth path as it narrows despite the wealth it has produced in the past. These last assessments have become much clearer and much easier to make in the wake of the collapse since 1994 of the political fortifications guarding white rule that continued to define the white minority as the unquestioned core population of South Africa.

When we turn to these very real and big questions, it puts into a somewhat new light much of the critical literature on the African National Congress government under Mandela (1994-99) and then Mbeki (1999-2008). That literature, notably the often very powerful writing of Patrick Bond and Hein Marais, has occupied most of the book shop table. (Bond, 2000 and many subsequent books and articles; Marais, 1998) The chief weakness of this thrust of thinking in my view, apart from an idealisation of what the ANC was like before 1994, lies in the tendency to encourage conspiracy theories of subversion. My interest is to turn away from a superficial, if by no means irrelevant, critique which sees the limitations of ANC efforts at structural transformation in terms of some kind of conspiracy or skullduggery on the part of white masterminds of evil, i.e. the Washington consensus of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and its multiple allies,
and return to thinking about the classic model of South African development that Wolpe, Legassick and others formulated and still others have pertinently elaborated.

One might start by looking at the process through which Washington consensus thinking became so influential. A long-time servant of the ANC governments since 1994 has emphasized the need for a defensive strategy for the fledgling democracy. South Africa’s increasing level of indebtedness and its dependence on the good will of powerful conservative states in a very right-wing world conjuncture were perhaps here determinant. (Hirsch, 2005) Partly this reflected the collapse of the possibility of reliance on that ‘other world’-- the Soviet Union-- which for many was no doubt a model in the years in exile. What took place there was not merely a question of political collapse due to a lack of political democracy in the Communist bloc. It also signalled changes in the way goods are produced and their sale organised, changes that made the classic model of development pinioned on capital goods industries and heavy duty infrastructure one that was increasingly out of date. At the same time, intensifying international competition under the wings of ever larger Western-based corporations makes it difficult to shelter from new trends in capitalism.

Those ANC cadres in exile may also have been expecting that they would eventually rise to power without any serious impediments in a glorious victory. Relatively suddenly, they were faced with a very different model that required a so-called elite pact which could only work if based on compromise and a capacity for moderation and absorption. Those few key trained people who, like Mbeki himself and later Finance Minister, the formidable Trevor Manuel, may have been driven by a hatred for National Party rule and the apartheid system but they had simultaneously lost, if ever they had it, any real faith in pursuing an autonomous radical economics model. And they were suddenly the ones in command of the levers of power.

It is true that this Washington consensus represented a very available and heavily sold discourse of knowledge and we all know-- since Foucault, if we did not before-- that knowledge, and control of knowledge, is power. The diplomatic wisdom of an Oliver Tambo, who led the ANC in exile, which worked hard to avoid any controversial policy commitments that might cut into its solidarity campaigns, also worked against the formation of cadres seriously planning reconstruction in a democratic South Africa. Loyalty to long-serving individuals rather than to policies has typified Congress while the South African Communist Party has tended to confine its critical views to international solidarity issues and very broad general perspectives not easy to pin down in practice. It is also true that the dominant model won out against an essentially Keynesian (i.e. redistribution orientated) left-wing policy agenda promoted by a far more politically marginal set of economists many of whom were, as the jibes had it, only well-meaning foreigners.  

Many activists in South Africa thought that the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a key instrument in promoting the 1994 election victory largely designed by NGOs sympathetic to the ANC, constituted a powerful focus for more radical change. The RDP however was a set of critical analyses of social circumstances in South
Africa that showed no way forward in terms of emphasis or priority and no basis for independence from the larger context of a fiscally constrained economic policy that from the beginning allowed only limited space for attacking those circumstances. In particular, there was little attempt to forge economic policies directly linked to structural transformation of any sort—‘growth through redistribution’. Indeed, the economic policies of the Mandela government showed marked continuity with the planning paradigm proposed under F.W. de Klerk, his National Party predecessor. Eventually the RDP became an ill-defined unit in the Office of President Mandela and subsequently was entirely dissolved.

The National, Education and Labour Council (NEDLAC) where the state was supposed to consult with ‘civil society’—i.e. community organisations, business and labour—was at first promoted as a form of corporate governance that might override conventional parliamentary structures in pursuing transformational goals; it evolved quickly into at best a moderately useful talk-shop with very limited influence on state policy making. Potentially, it is the trade unions and notably the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which constituted a barrier to the state acting on its own. An assessment of COSATU’s interventions in the years after 1994 suggest its importance in bringing up on many occasions, and with reference to many specific but key policies, a perspective that criticises assumptions about competitiveness and globalisation as justifications for questionable legislative decisions. COSATU has stood up for more action against unemployment, a less business orientated educational policy and generally more inclusive policies that would benefit the working class. It has notably supported the idea of a Basic Income Grant. (BIG) Nevertheless it is difficult to conclude that it has the capacity, will or strength to formulate counter-policies that move from generalities to clear and differently aimed trajectories. (see COSATU, 2004)

The chief problem of the Washington consensus, by the way, cannot seriously be held to be financial rectitude; that has been a necessity for every type of government in the longer term including the Soviet Union in its heyday and those influenced by it. The ANC was surely not wrong to concern itself with the implications of dependence that growing indebtedness may have brought about after 1994. The question is not how the state should become a source of unlimited largesse but rather what end its rectitude serves, the profits of banks and boards of directors or some structured national purpose. The real limitations of ANC policy have not been the product of ill will or corruption although they certainly do involve the limited capacity of ANC cadres untrained for promoting momentous shifts in the making of policy. Implementation of policy is a large acknowledged problem in the new South Africa. Implementation alone however is a superficial way of understanding the problème of development in this country as we return to the key critical studies identified above; the problems lie as well or more profoundly with conceptualisation.

However, it would also be incorrect to see South Africa’s post-apartheid policies purely in terms of a Washington blueprint. Where local politics dictated other solutions, they sometimes trumped international wisdom so-called. For instance, in the institution of trade union legislation, that fiery opponent of GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), the instrument which came to be the red flag of Washington consensus orthodoxy.
inflaming the left, trade union leader Zwelindaba Vavi, has written in 2004 that ‘…our interventions have made a significant difference. These include the negotiation of a worker-friendly constitution, the adoption of progressive labour legislation, including the promotion of trade unions and collective bargaining, and the extension of basic protection to the most vulnerable workers [and] the defense and further consolidation of our labour dispensation in the face of concerted attacks by business, and attempts to introduce retrogressive amendments.’ (COSATU, 2004) What could be more inimical to the way the World Trade Organisation bureaucrats interpret globalisation?

Nor can the long shadow of the World Bank explain the emphasis, a growing one, on redistribution through the spread of infrastructural services or free homes, a set of policies which has met with mixed results and reception but is hardly orthodox. According to the latest census calculations, government grants are the main source of income amongst the poorest 50% of the population, not salaries, not the informal sector and certainly not peasant livelihood activities. On the one hand, South Africa’s unequal property and income patterns are extreme but on the other, Seekings & Nattrass demonstrate that for a country of its income level, South African redistribution patterns are unusually generous. Many critical international NGOs talk about the downtrodden of the world who earn less than $1 a day. All South African pensioners are entitled to an income, by the standards of the exchange rates of the end of 2007, of about three times that. Nor is this deviation all that unique: shrewd international observers have noted elsewhere that the apparent ‘inevitable’ rules that govern globalisation continue to show more leeway for clever holders of niches in the international economy than this implies. (Ong, 2006)

One might finally point out that the terms of the debate have shifted in the phase of Mbeki’s second term in office. GEAR is no longer a cloak for policy. The Mbeki government presided over sober deflationary budgets that promoted South African business interests. However, GEAR failed to attract much foreign investment or protect the currency very successfully; for some years it was marked by low economic growth figures, disinvestment and job losses, as Gelb demonstrates in fact and figure. With substantially lowered indebtedness and a return to moderate growth figures after many years, the state has become more generous in its redistribution policies and openly abandoned some aspects of the GEAR period, notably the drive for privatisation, which in any event was quite partial and arguably more about the enrichment of a class of black pro-ANC entrepreneurs than a genuine interest in pushing back the state. Several authors below, notably Gelb, consider the formal abandonment of GEAR and the adoption of ASGISA, which passed as a blueprint in the 2006-08 years at the end of the Mbeki presidency. However, the broad lines of policies, which this essay argues are not simply enforced by a Washington-based conspiracy, have not changed and the challenges in the name of development that the state faced in 1994 are certainly still with us.

In our view, probably the most insidious aspect of the supposed international consensus has been its acceptance, as a permanent given, of a dualism that bears considerable resemblance to the supposed double nature of the South African economy. Internationally, even conservative and reformist notions of development after 1945 contained the shadow, as suggested above, of holistic transformation of society. The debate was over whether
such notions were realistic as opposed to more extreme makeovers based on political revolution. Classic macro-studies considered the long-term trajectories of such countries as Brazil and India and looked at the capabilities and class character of the state in post-independence Africa. It was this debate that was forcibly shut down after 1980. The language of development discourse has changed in the West into one where structural changes of a deeper nature are neglected or rejected as impractical and impossible and the social side of development policy, the charity and hand-outs element, is glorified as ‘poverty alleviation’ and turned into the progressive side of things with a dualistic separation between the two. As Bob Shenton brought out in our workshop discussions, international social work is tending to take over a ‘professionalised’ and ever less subversive development studies. Where once the definition of development suffered from being too narrowly economic, it is now impoverished by leaving the economic out almost entirely. For South Africa, this is inimical. This is a country that needs a sense of development that is holistic and is tied in closely to an understanding of its social and economic history more broadly.

At a superficial level, who can disagree with Mbeki as with his liberal predecessors? Dualism makes the greatest sense for any intelligent observer of South African society. And with the demise of so-called Fordist labour market practices in their South African form, with the restructuring of the market so as to lead to a downturn in industrial employment or at best stagnation, isn’t the further problem the creation of a permanent underclass unable to benefit from mobility and unable to mobilise effectively beyond sharp, and sometimes very violent, local actions? The Marxist dream of a unified working class, achieving consciousness of its potential through the opportunities created by mass industrialisation, is not sustainable without substantial modification. Scattered and often inchoate protest by the so-called multitude might lead to populist leadership assuming power but is no substitute for any coherent process of transformation. These same problems are being faced by regimes with a deep interest in transformation such as those in Brazil and Venezuela which also have substantial fiscal resources (and far more dedicated and substantially trained cadres in various development fields) but also struggle to find actual practical solutions suitable to the global environment of the early 21st century. Internationally the question of forming not just a better life but an effective new role as citizens, thus enacting Sen’s vision of freedom, from the tens of millions emerging from peasant worlds and so-called traditional cultural practices but who clearly are not going to form communities based on industrial demand and on the basis of patriarchal male-led families, is arguably the central problem of today’s world, certainly the central human problem facing development as a practice.

In another sense too, Mbeki was certainly right: South Africa cannot isolate itself from these general problems through inward-looking solutions that disregard the deep connections our economy and society have with changes in the larger world. We cannot recreate the past. Moreover, South Africa, and here the government’s conception is equally valid, must also and inevitably be the engine that takes at least the small and much weaker states of southern Africa forwards. We have to learn from and interact with so-
called globalisation and learn from successful interventions. This means accepting that it offers opportunities, contains dangers and raises new barriers to real transformation.

Thus I find much of the *ubuntu* talk assuming that the ‘African’ inheritance contains convenient answers to the problems of modern life soft if not outright reactionary, a deflection away from the hard issues. There is little salvation in *ubuntu* if we are seriously engaged in a project of modernisation even if indigenous local knowledge might at times provide some with an attractive idiom for this process. Maybe it is mentalities and ways of accessing knowledge, not shifts in tariff legislation or the ownership of basic services that have to give way. Galvin in this volume suggests, for instance, that the possibility of major changes at the micro-level depend on the extent to which there actually are new forces from below willing to challenge the cake of custom while Hunter reminds us that it is seizing forms of modernity that powerfully engage the masses rather than recoveries of tradition. The mass of southern Africans will have to come to terms with the culture and mentality that goes with that project, not only its mechanical and cybernetic materialities abstracted from human agency and cultural change. The suggestion here is that the writers discussed above all believe intensely in the need for transformation to be first and foremost that sort of modernising project. This is the human content of a new economic ‘growth path’—inevitably.

Perhaps the first point to make here is that there is a need first and foremost for human agents of change on a large scale. It is going to be necessary in South Africa to develop cadres who can use the schools, the media and real local knowledge, coming from or being stationed in every municipality, every significant spatial community, to lead the modernisation drive that can help mould or stimulate a population that can respond effectively to global trends. No mere computers or tinned media voices can possibly act as a substitute. Plans, for instance, to cope with the effects of the HIV-AIDS pandemic could include very significantly ways of promoting biomedicine and an appreciation and general understanding of science as well as involve the formation of crèches and other institutions that could serve as care-giving safety nets but also generate new ideas amongst large numbers of people. There was much potential for the development of such cadres in the United Democratic Front, the chief anti-apartheid vehicle of the 1980s. This was unfortunately snuffed out by its dissolution in 1994. The UDF as it existed in the 1980s was a noisy and creative agency with very substantial diversity and the potential to engage a very wide range of actors for change. In subsequent years, activists have been absorbed and assimilated into an existing, at the top end overpaid, civil service which lacks any serious transformative purpose and whom the state can discipline only with difficulty. By contrast, over a wide front it is clear that ‘youth’ is characterised by extremely high levels of anti-social behaviour, criminality and a descent into AIDS infection. Indeed comrades in the 1990 often retained their attraction to violence but dropped any kind of political commitment. (Krämer, 2007)

Even those remaining completely dedicated to a struggle-based ideal of transformation have increasingly had to operate within straightjackets that limit their potential to generate new ideas and discussion. It is often said that bureaucracies have this insidious effect on revolutions and South Africa (which cannot be said to have actually experienced a
revolution), is certainly no exception. Pieterse in this volume presents us with a masterful assessment of why the state, to take a cliché, seems to lack the capacity to ‘implement’ fine ideals; he considers the limits imposed by the 1994 compromise, the retention of informal influence by fixed interest groups and the extent to which new interest groups have taken on the colour of the old within the bureaucracies. There was a vision of what a transformed South African city should be in terms of desegregation, compaction, access and opportunity but no real mechanism has ever developed to override existing structures to bring that vision to pass. Certainly the problems of ‘implementation’ are closely linked to the whip hand which imposes what Todes et al label centralised decentralisation and often misreads the real needs of people at the base very substantially. Galvin, at the opposite extreme of rural KwaZulu-Natal from the metropolitan bounds of Cape Town that concern Pieterse, provides an important corrective here; she stresses that whatever the good intentions of the state or of NGO intervention activists, the ground has to be readied through a background of activism and mobilisation for any kind of significant social change.

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In the next few pages, a few key areas of weakness in a holistic developmental project are going to be outlined. First and perhaps foremost is the character of South Africa’s schools, a basic issue which is not followed up in the selections below but which requires highlighting. If we follow Feinstein and insist that overcoming our deficiency in human capital, in the quality and capacity of what South African citizens can do, education is basic. Yet, if we go back to the much vaunted RDP document of 1994 we will find that it occupies less than a page, less space than the subject of sport. Moreover there is a crude assumption that what is at stake is simply equalising the educational budget, not the standards, discipline and orientation of the schools. This is astonishing. On the one hand, while all schools get equal state subsidies, those subsidies are very small; the successful schools overwhelmingly depend on massive private subsidisation by parents voted on in the name of community control. The absorption of the large Bantustan and DET education establishments into a deracialised system without any ethos of discipline and upgrade, without any culture of scientific enquiry, has largely been a failure. Graeme Bloch, once a prominent intellectual associated with the Cape Town UDF, began a recent article in writing that ‘South Africa must face up to the fact that our schools are a national disaster.’ (Mail & Guardian, February 1-7, 2008) This has more recently been stressed as well in speech and writing by Mamphela Ramphele, a former doctor and anthropologist, of the University of Cape Town and most recently the World Bank. A recent survey of secondary schools in dozens of countries focussing on mathematics and science was unable to find anywhere in the world, including on the African continent, which ranked lower in achievement than these so-called Model A schools. (Reddy, 2006) To complement this, regional research survey by the South African Institute of Race Relations explored the fact that ‘South African [primary] schools are among the worst in Africa’, here covering English as well as quantitative skills. (Business Day, 8 November, 2008) Nonetheless such information is not often brought to the attention of the public; international comparisons are embarrassing.
We now have an education budget in which 90% goes to salaries. The limited bureaucratic controls on competence and performance have largely disappeared as an apartheid shackle. Model C schools, permitted to sustain far higher quality education based on fee payment agreed to by self-perpetuating parental communities, opt out of this dreadful system, do teach a significant number of black as well as white students but inevitably only cater to a relatively small minority and perpetuate the painful inequality of the past in a form only questionably less stark. As a result, only a very thin trickle of young people coming of these systems have the skills or mentality that will allow them to operate effectively at the kind of career jobs, administrative and technical situations, which can actually carry not only the country but themselves and their families forwards. This couples with ANC racial policies which insistently promote blacks to such jobs in the public sector and are obsessed with removing white males from decision-making positions of power. Through pressures exemplified by the voluntary but heavily touted Black Economic Empowerment system, which tries to promote black participation in business ownership and management, even the private sector is substantially affected. This is a formula designed to promote mediocrity and corruption. It would be unfair to surmise that Mbeki’s Minister of Education Naledi Pandor and others working in education policy are unaware of the situation but there is thus far little general willingness to understand that it represents a crisis and that its resolution is central to any kind of serious development strategy.

A second area for debate is urban policy which is touched by a number of our contributors. The ANC government has juridically opened up the cities up to all with complex consequences. Moreover, the rapid growth of a black middle class and the demographic decline in the white population are opening up city life to previously excluded elements while established townships, especially in the bigger cities, have greatly increased their social amenities and profited from the extension of urban infrastructure. In Johannesburg especially, the ANC must also be credited with major efforts to revive a decayed city centre. There are successes in changing existing patterns up to a point.

However, there is certainly a need to redirect urban policy in terms of integration of the working class into city life more fully. One aspect of this is the increasingly noted contradiction whereby the state fails to provide mass employment or some substitute payment while expecting the public as consumers to pay for impressively extended services. The latest state Community Survey highlights achievements in terms of primary school attendance, access to piped water and flush toilets. Here overall figures for South Africa are now approaching the highest levels attained in countries generally defined as 3rd world. Yet poor advice from so-called international best practice dominated by corporate influence goes hand in hand with the greed of those benefiting from state contracts to create a situation which is not merely illogical but brings about bitter, often violent resistance that has actually led to significant loss of life in recent years. (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005; Ballard et al, 2006) Here the interests of new accumulators, as well as existing corporate interests, rather than those of the broad public, dominate. For some observers, such as Bond and Ndlovu in this volume, the answer lies in a new politics based on popular resistance. By contrast, Siwisa, looking at struggles over the provision of
reticulated clean water, while aware of the failings of the state’s delivery roll-out, is equally sceptical of these politics, thinks they are partly headless and partly self-serving, and sees the answer elsewhere.

There is an urgent need to create a workable system that poor people understand as fundamentally just but also provides for the sustainability of service infrastructure. Apartheid was by definition a spatial policy that assigned room to people based on their skin colour, eventually modified to some extent by income. Inevitably the end of apartheid tied into pressures for significant human movement that reflects the perceptions of South Africans as to where they can provide themselves with a better living. It hardly seems necessary to explain that this inevitably attracts them to cities with rapid economic growth rates. In particular, the cities of Gauteng Province, Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the Cape Town area have experienced rapid in-migration since 1990 although the patterns of human movement in South Africa are quite complex. How to expedite the urbanisation of new layers of people with more ambition and hope than resources? How to turn migrants into citizens who can understand how to participate in representative forms of government? How to create a symbolic language of participation and inclusion that accepts the need to compromise between the urges of different classes in society? These problems are also in desperate need of action following more integrated thinking with strong developmental implications for the burgeoning cities.

If education policy is bedevilled by the felt need of the ANC to empower teachers and administrators from a mediocre and essentially dysfunctional system, and to move extremely fast on placing cadres in positions that exude status and power, the same could be said to some extent of housing policy. Thabo Mbeki often made his feelings clear: housing policy, and this has meant the construction of perhaps two million so-called RDP houses, must foreground the need for black people to overcome the humiliation of living in shacks. Having houses that, as much as possible, mimic white suburban houses in respectability is the priority. The problem is that the inhabitants so often lead very irregular family lives with unpredictable incomes and a scarcity of stable jobs: they simply lack the money to sustain suburban comforts. The result are uncomfortable compromises: houses that are sometimes poorly constructed, very small and inevitably located on the cheapest land the state can find, sometimes very inconvenient for participation in the urban economy. The taxi revolution (which of course has empowered a stratum of black entrepreneurs and employs many black drivers) has driven out thoughts of an integrated public transport policy which would serve masses of people and tie cities or regions together in line with a housing policy.

It was in the second Mbeki term that the Minister of Housing, with claims at a breakthrough in new policy, launched the Gateway scheme, intended to create denser housing, economically sustainable for working people, near the N2 freeway that leads from the airport to the city centre in Cape Town. This has been a colossal failure thus far that exemplifies the problems. The quality of the housing (built by the corporate private sector) has been badly compromised and yet there is no stable working class (like that which classically brought on genuine housing shortages as in post-war Britain or industrialising revolutionary Russia) that can pay for sustained higher quality. In the
meantime, thousands of poor people who have been squatting in what is termed the Joe Slovo informal settlement have been displaced with the possibility only of removal to Delft, a distant Cape Flats township notorious for poor quality housing profitably built by the building industry. Pieterse, whose focus lies in Cape Town, brilliantly captures the way incremental delivery has been encapsulated in existing patterns of social division even if racial exclusion is no longer part of the agenda.

The government has yet to evolve effective rental property schemes and it continues to cold shoulder informal settlement upgrade on the assumption that this is unworthy of the new South Africa. A realistic policy that can take people forwards is needed. It might even be suggested that the state should place its money into transport and direct employment creation rather than following the chimera of handing out free houses in response to a supposed housing shortage. Gateway symbolises this: as activists complain: ‘There is a big open space between the existing N2 Gateway housing and our informal settlement. This is where government wants to build bond housing for those earning more than R7500 a month, which is quite out of our range as many of us are unemployed.’ (Mzwanele Zulu in *Amandla* 2, October 2007). When actually polled, the public invariably turn to unemployment and crime, not to inadequate housing, as the most fundamental problems they see around themselves. Perhaps their instincts at this basic level are correct? These contradictions are certainly played out in the sphere of provision of electricity and water reticulation, themes written about extensively elsewhere and in this volume by Ndlovu and Bond and by Siwisa.

There is an argument that, by making many houses of this quality available to poor women with dependents, a positive social benefit has ensued but it is one that does not connect to any wider sense of socialisation as is pointed out incisively in this volume by Hunter, Hassim and by Todes et al especially. Formal policies have to link up to initiatives from below, NGO activities and the formation of locally based activists. It has to connect to social policy that ties in to adult education and improved schooling as well as health education and family policy but also, through surveillance and building up neighbourhood ties, a struggle against the extraordinary high rates of violent crime from which everyone suffers and which, taken on a local or national scale, has a huge effect in braking economic development. Crime rates must be assumed to stand as well for widespread attitudes to law and order which also need to change in order to allow for economic development to diffuse and involve the population more widely.

It should probably be added, because it is not often acknowledged that statistics since 2001 suggest that unemployment, whether contracting or expanding somewhat, is certainly expanding less than poorly paid employment. The problem is not simply lack of jobs but payment according to market relationships set up in earlier times, market relationships which countless opponents of apartheid pointed out in studies that earmarked the harsh forms of exploitation typical of the South African growth path. Labour market policy continues to preside over a situation where jobs which are genuinely unskilled but also where skill is not recognised are very lowly-paid compared to those affixed to educational qualification and status. Why should cleaners or cashiers make so little compared to all white collar workers? If there remains a worker in this category absolutely central to the
economy, just as in Wolpe’s day, albeit less numerous and not tied into gold, it is surely the miner. Yet miners, often hired today on some kind of contract basis, earn less in buying power than they did fifteen years ago…at a job which in fact is normally reasonably well-paid in many countries. Schirmer & Böhm below point to the problems created by instituting a minimum wage which substitutes for paternalist relations but does not actually create a living wage for farm workers. Minimum wage legislation is in good part due to the intervention of COSATU but COSATU lacks the ability to make a better way of life real in such situations; legislation is not enough.

Over the past decade, more and more attention has been paid to the idea of a skills shortage. The old apprenticeship system has virtually died and the attempt by the state to create a work-related skills programme under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour, the SETAs, has been adjudged marginal and dominated by ‘low-level training’ where modest bureaucratically set targets are relatively easy to reach but also basically irrelevant. (Johnston, 2007) Again, the real bull has yet to be grasped by the horns. Attempts through so-called outcomes based education, a trend borrowed wholesale from far wealthier countries without anything like the apartheid inheritance to make schooling more practical, have been poorly executed and are largely despised even within the education bureaucracy itself; the kind of sophisticated project required to make such a system work is not a current possibility in a country that needs to work extremely hard on diffusing the traditional education basics. COSATU, in the formative years of its components, struggled to create a more humane world of work that could sustain a world of citizens. (Friedman, 1987; Seidman, 1994) Cannot the relatively prosperous trading conditions of recent years be used to resume progress in this direction?

But of course, not everyone can or should be living in the big cities. Urbanisation policies that take South Africa forward need desperately to be combined with integrated rural development policies that can improve life for the majority of small town and country dwellers. There is a need to manage urban departures, to provide security and build livelihoods through advancing non-agricultural activity and projects which in turn depends on a systematic and well-informed state presence throughout the countryside. Rural policy—increasingly—has been equated with racially defined ‘land reform’ despite an impressive literature which demonstrates how little land transfer actually does, in isolation from a host of other necessary measures to empower poor rural people. (Walker, 2004; James, 2007; Ntsebeza & Hall, forthcoming) The needs of the rural poor can be measured, in a quote from our workshop guest, Henry Bernstein, that African cultivators increasingly are becoming too poor to farm. Here again the contradictory mesh of market-led philosophy and the political urgency of redistribution clash; a central issue raised in this volume by James. Witt points out additionally that technological fixes, ultimately benefiting some market forces, remain an apparently solid but in reality ineffective way of channelling rural transformation. Inevitably, secure life on the land requires both very effective forms of farmer self-organisation and a myriad of state interventions. You can’t take subsidies away from more marginal white farmers, have them leave and then seriously expect equally or more marginal black farmers to thrive under the same circumstances. Witt proposes, for instance, the desirability of subsidising peasant farmers systematically. Rural policy as well should move away from a simple exploitative view of
resources on hand to one that makes healthier use of that resource base, more varied and even perhaps intensive. Rural life also has to build new connections with the city and the national economy in ways that make it more attractive and economically functional, not necessarily based on agriculture. Interestingly, this is indeed happening for the well-resourced white middle class in favoured regions, especially the hinterland of Cape Town stretching along the coasts and into the Karoo but it needs far more creative assistance to reach further and start to build a better life for the majority of potential rural citizens.

Instead, change in the countryside is often dominated by a racialised fantasy of land reform (which if genuinely developmental, ought strictly to be about farm size or to concern creating a more even playing field between owners and workers as suggested by Schirmer & Böhm), a moderate and somewhat marketised version of the vengeful and economically disastrous ‘fast track’ land reform taking place after 2001 in Zimbabwe. Transfers in land ownership must be subordinated to a broader policy of struggle against rural poverty, a diffusion of state cadres in countryside, policing, schools and the like, use of media and schools, promotion of modern ideas about health, equality between sexes, etc. as well as encouragement for rural people to organise themselves democratically and securely. Security is important in two senses. The situation where economic activity can barely take place due to a virtual collapse of law and order is one aspect. We often read about ‘farm murders’; it is salutary to see how uncertain property relations and widespread theft makes most economic initiatives impossible in a former Bantustan milieu. (Hebinck & Lent, 2007) In addition, while the state needs to support medium black and white entrepreneurs so their tenure on the land is less fragile through the formation of networks of public and private partnerships, but there is equally a need to support economically variegated forms of living in rural areas. The countryside in the 21st century is not going to be dominated purely by farm activities; allied and complementary economic activities are already essential. It is also critical to remember that very large numbers of rural people live, and will continue to live unless they leave the land entirely, in the former Bantustan homelands whose problems certainly cannot be solved by transferring them to white-owned farms at substantial distances from their present residences. Here again, needs are distinctive in different areas, require more than just agricultural improvement and tie in to the state’s dependence on the Mamdani world of chief and subject. (Galvin in this volume; Ntsebeza, 2005; Oomen, 2005) A focus on shifting land ownership from white to black without being tied to wider reforms will merely recreate the impoverished living conditions of the old ‘black spots’ of the early apartheid era. Integrated rural development will miss out almost everyone if it is narrowly fixed on creating black commercial farmers out of the current marginalised rural population, as James stresses. Wishing people from one side of the divided society into another is just not good enough.

Democratisation of these areas requires as well a wide-ranging development policy based on local knowledge. In this sense, the Local Economic Development philosophy current in international thinking by allowing a focus on the local and the particular, is a potential breakthrough although its Eurocentric emphasis on the role of the private sector is completely unrealistic in much of South Africa. Above all, we need to bring skilled and intelligent people in large numbers into every municipality who can conscientise them and
convince people that change is possible, a tall order of change that will take a long time to germinate.

Whether physically located in cities or outside of them, this book points in yet another major direction: the requirement to move from dinosaur project development that fitted the MEC model but whose deficiencies in terms of environmental cost and increasing technological backwardness, as well as their inability to employ large numbers of less educated South Africans in those forms that are typical of contemporary conditions, are increasingly obvious. It could be said that South Africa has a strong tradition of a developmental state aimed at harmonising the interests of the private sector and the public as the state defines it but the modalities that governed that way of operating are increasingly directing us in ways we should not want to be replicating. Bond & Molefi, Hallowes and Fig in this volume are all powerful markers pointing the way here. The 'new' South Africa should be about not replacing white with black executives necessarily but with thinking through new alternatives to, for example, the intensifying pre-1994 emphasis on a wide-ranging high-quality arms industry that built on the social skills typical of the world of apartheid (Henk, 2006) This is becoming more obvious in terms of the gradually deepening international energy crisis which casts cold comfort on industrialisation based on subsidised and energy-intensive coal fuel. Backward South African executives have treated ‘green’ innovation as some kind of incomprehensible politically correct fashion; new ideas here have come to the fore very late. The South African electricity shortages manifest from 2006 on and reaching crisis proportion at the end of 2007, considered here by David Fig, have finally brought home the folly of this as well as the extent to which South Africa falls behind countries likely to bring about key changes to their benefit with reference to energy and global warming. Fig observes South Africa moving from very limited interests in large-scale plans for renewable energy to panic planning on an uncertain knowledge base when suddenly a public clamour does arise. Plans for dinosaur mega-projects that belong to the MEC road such as the aluminium plant intended to be the key economic investment in a huge project to build up Coega harbour near Port Elizabeth which will guzzle cheap energy, provide a handful of jobs but bring in an initial thrust of foreign investment with easy profits for various contractors, may have to be put on ice.

In this volume, we have tried to take environmental issues very seriously. Hallowes paints a poignant picture of the costs of development in one region in terms of human well-being, notably in the field of health, and in the future of a vulnerable landscape, in terms of what he calls ‘environmental justice.’ Ndlovu and Bond remind us of the key importance of national water policy in a dry sub-continent which may become dryer as global warming intensifies. Elsewhere Walker, known for her commitment to land restitution, suggests that there are cases, here looking at Lake St. Lucia, where the general good in terms of maintaining environmental standards, should override both business interests and those of ‘communities’ hoping to claim particular benefits for themselves from politicised resources. Corporate interests, largely international at source, promise a better future for small farmers in a context where the chemicals they produce become a required part of agriculture. Harald Witt points out that the evidence for this does not necessarily bear out such rosy estimates. On the contrary, given the vulnerability of the land and the difficulties
small farmers face, he suggests that innovations need to be very thoroughly monitored and considered with scepticism before adaptations that reverse old established patterns with which people are familiar. His views coincide with those of Fig and with Ndlovu and Bond over the dependence of the South African growth path on techno-fixes.

The final strand this introduction wishes to emphasise is gender. Several of the contributions in this volume put an important emphasis on gender issues which are absolutely vital to the direction of social change. On the one hand, there is the need to give equal opportunity to women as independent actors in ways that can also nurture young people in secure environments. Areas of policy such as housing and the labour market are vitally important here. Gender equality is promoted strongly in the South African constitution and there is continued need to give life to constitutional ideals by taking seriously and targeting the actual gender environment in this country. But the social context of production requires systematic thinking about social reproduction rather than women’s representation in parliament and other bodies whose individual leaders earn big salaries. Women’s rights and the empowerment demands of the ANC Women’s League are not enough: there is equally the need to develop social and family possibilities that promote the raising of children in ways other than handing young people over to grandparents, into providing crèches, schools and other institutions that have a real educative function and that create a stable basis for life in spatial communities where market value dominance has so far just offered poverty. Todes et al, Hassim, James, Hunter and others elsewhere in this volume, consider from different angles that there is now in place only a reduced and dehumanised skeleton of a vision which is insufficient. The problem lies not with rights, which as this chapter emphasises from the start, coincides well with neo-liberalism to whose most attractive aspect it speaks. However, rights talk does not by itself make interventionist social policy happen. It is also true, and this reiterates a theme that underlines most contributions, that there is virtually no feminist movement on the ground to develop strategies and frame demands that would forward women’s interests and improve gender relations. Hassim is perhaps the most prominent amongst those who have defended the view that a significant women’s movement had a real impact during the key transition years but she joins others in seeing those embers largely extinguished now. (Hassim, 2006) Our authors differ on the centrality of autonomous movements from below in sympathy with debates internationally but they clearly have an important, even if insufficient, role to play.

In the past two years, the Mbeki regime has signalled a declining confidence in the potential of foreign investment and privatisation and advertised itself as promoter of industrialisation with state-led impetus welcomed. In early 2008, it became obvious to the public that electrical provision for maintenance, let alone development, in South Africa, was in serious trouble as a result of a wave of enforced power cuts. The failures of privatisation have, according to many acute critics had much to do with the failure of ESKOM, the national electricity parastatal whose policy debates had focussed for years on planning for privatisation, not fulfilling national power needs effectively. However, this message has so far not achieved much compared to the juggernaut represented by Manuel’s Ministry of Finance and its overall scepticism towards solutions outside the IFI market perspective. The developmental state, if one can return to this paradigm which was
probably most effectively carried out in the 1940s and 1950s in the interests of a development path we are now in some respects rejecting, will require far more than rhetoric, to take on some reality. Ben Fine himself has recently commented on the promotion of the idea of a developmental state by stressing that ‘…the close relationship between gold, iron and steel production still remains at the core of South African industry…policies have continued to make financial speculation extremely profitable as opposed to leading economic activity…a determination to succeed also requires a political conflict with those in control of the economy. ‘(In *Amandla*, 2, October 2007). It can be argued moreover that the conflict would be not merely with the captains of industry but with the BEE appointees who are now equally dependent on the existing system rather than, as may have been intended, a new breed of South African capitalist. This is not to gainsay the importance of the return of the developmental state to the stage as a debating point. What choices will now be made as the Mbeki era fades? 15

Gelb, Hassim, Pieterse and the MEC critics in this volume all in one grand sense write the same thing: the dualism that concerns Mbeki rhetorically is not really being challenged; changes taking place are welcome, real, significant but occur within a market-dominated, growth path that reproduces that dualism as a matter of course. Many of our contributors are comfortable using the term ‘neo-liberal’ to describe this context. By contrast, this introduction promotes the need for a vision that integrates change in the first and second economies in defiance of the dichotomy between an idealised version of market-led globalisation-friendly business growth and a charitably intended ‘poverty alleviation’ backside, turned into a substitute for development. One needs devoted cadres who work for the government as well as all manner of independent agents for change on the ground. The long-term goal is actually finding what struggle literature once loved to address as ‘the way forward’, long-term plans that build. This approach as a matter of course must accept that what is desirable is a tall order that will take a very long time and always face contradictions. The development of a large community of individuals able to study and debate development issues in South Africa itself is a major task that has a very long way to go although it actually has advanced if one observes public discourse over the years since 1994. . This is the first stage which this book means to stimulate. However, the consequences of faltering in political and developmental terms and of foreshortening understandings of transformation into simply exchanging a capable but very conservative white bureaucracy for a black one without clear moorings might not merely build antagonisms and stifle possibilities but, on reaching a dead end, bring about historic regression.

This introduction has tried merely to suggest and not to reiterate the many-sided and rich contributions that follow but it is only an introduction; hopefully the chapters that follow open up more space for advancing debates and a learning process while restoring concern for the big questions inherent in South African development issues.

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This understanding became more insistent from the 1970s. See Arndt, 1981.

Although much that is very interesting on colonial and post-colonial economic activity in the Gold Coast and elsewhere in West Africa has been written since, Amin’s schematic critique of the cash crop ‘miracles’ of West Africa has never bettered for clarity as an introduction.

For an internationally widely-known example, see the collection by Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997. For some powerful assessments of where ‘development’ comes from, see Cowen & Shenton, 1996 and Rist, 1996.

Not so surprisingly the biggest success in South African consumer capitalism has been the growth and virtual monopoly role of South African Breweries, now one of the biggest international players in beer brewing. The forthcoming work of Anne Mager will make this story clearer.

The well-known Gini coefficient measures the relationship between the top and bottom deciles.

For a defense, see Michie & Padayachee, 1997. Padayachee was amongst those involved in the MERG group.

Obviously those working in this paradigm have contributed important micro-studies and are by no means without insights of their own. If the critique of the Third World state has gone much too far, and is often extremely crude, understandings of its real limitations and foibles have been enriched by the anti-statist phase so fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s especially.


This aspect is captured in the work, for instance, of Linda Chisholm, 2008 but redress only partly captures the problem.

The work of André Kraak on skills is particularly useful. For this issue see what he and others have written in McGrath, 2004.

For an important essay that makes this point but takes a somewhat different tack see Greenberg, 2003. The situation on white owned farms is handled with breadth and depth in Atkinson, 2007, a work focussed on the southern Free State. Her ideas parallel those in Schirmer & Böhmke on many points.

For an impressive survey that considers possibilities, with reference to the former Ciskei, see Hebinck & Lent, 2007.

For a more conservative but very well-researched consideration of energy issues, see Winkler, 2009. He emphasizes that no potential solution is comprehensive or ideal. Electric power in particular is considered by a wide range of authors in McDonald, 2009.

The same issue of *Amandla* also highlights a long interview with newly appointed Deputy Minister of Trade & Industry Robert Davies who certainly promotes encouraging ideas along some of the lines suggested in this introduction. His appointment and subsequent events does signal an openness to critical ideas within the ANC whose consequences are still to be seen.